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This Article evaluates recent dramatic developments in Delaware law surrounding 
merger litigation and concludes that they have gone too far in limiting the ability to challenge 
managerial wrongdoing in the takeover context. The past three years have seen a sea change 
in merger litigation, brought on by the twin earthquakes of the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
decision in Corwin v. KKR and the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in In re 
Trulia. Both of these decisions were inspired by a perceived crisis in merger litigation. By 
2015, the percentage of economically significant deals challenged by at least one lawsuit had 
been hovering at or above 90% for years. The vast bulk of these suits were resolved via 
“disclosure only” settlements that provided little or no value to stockholders, but secured broad 
releases from liability for defendants and significant fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys. Decades of 
academic debate over the merits of stockholder litigation had reached a rare degree of consensus: 
at least with regard to merger lawsuits, the merits were meaningless and litigation had devolved 
into absurdity.  
The explosion of dubious merger litigation demanded a response. On the one hand, most 
prominently in In re Trulia, the Court of Chancery took direct and long-overdue measures 
to remove the incentives that drove the crisis by increasing scrutiny of low-value settlements 
and accompanying releases of liability. On the other hand, a series of ill-considered decisions 
culminating in Corwin allowed defendants to avoid judicial scrutiny altogether by adopting 
various procedural safeguards, despite the lack of evidence that these safeguards will be 
effective. These decisions will almost certainly reduce merger litigation but are likely to do so 
relatively indiscriminately, blocking frivolous and meritorious claims alike. This Article 
concludes that the procedural safe harbors created in Corwin and its brethren should be 
reconsidered as unjustified by the recent merger litigation crisis, and inconsistent with 
longstanding Delaware law and the realities of merger practice.  
INTRODUCTION 
Despite its youth, the twenty-first century has already seen two sea changes in 
Delaware merger litigation. The waters rose, and now the waters are falling back. 
After hovering around 40% for years, the percentage of merger deals challenged by 
at least one class action lawsuit surged after 2008, remaining over 90% for several 
years and even approaching 95% in some years.1 Then, just as abruptly, the wave 
 
1. See Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 
620 (2018) [hereinafter Shifting Tides]; Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon,  
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crested and began to recede. By 2016, the percentage of deals facing a lawsuit 
dropped to 73%, with suits in Delaware cut nearly in half.2 Early data suggest the 
rapid drop has continued into 2017, particularly in the Delaware Court of 
Chancery.3 The factors leading to the sharp rise in merger litigation are subject to 
some dispute. The recent drop, however, was manifestly the result of recent judicial 
actions in Delaware.  
These actions came in response to a rare degree of consensus among both 
academics and practitioners alike: the system was clearly broken. Nearly every 
economically significant deal resulted in fiduciary duty litigation, and the vast bulk 
of such cases resolved with little or no benefit to stockholders—but with handsome 
fees for the lawyers and broad releases for the defendants.4 Such a system could 
provide neither meaningful deterrence of wrongdoing nor meaningful 
compensation for aggrieved stockholders, and ultimately served no plausible social 
purpose other than as an employment program for lawyers.  
The response of the Delaware courts was two-pronged and almost 
immediately effective at reducing merger litigation. The first prong—which I argue 
below was a mistake—was a substantive relaxation of the standard of review for 
merger-related claims, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail.5 A long 
series of cases had gradually weakened the entire fairness standard that had been 
applied to majority stockholder squeeze-outs since the landmark Weinberger decision 
in 1983.6 This weakening reached its culmination in the 2014 case Kahn v. M&F 
Worldwide Corp. (MFW).7 In MFW, the Delaware Supreme Court held that approval 
by an empowered committee of independent directors and a majority of the 
minority stockholder vote would entitle a majority stockholder squeeze-out to 
business judgment rule deference.8  
The next year, the court carried the reasoning behind MFW to its logical 
conclusion, holding in Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC (Corwin) that “when a 
merger that is not subject to the entire fairness standard of review has been 
 
Takeover Litigation in 2014 (Feb. 20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript, available at https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2567902 [https://perma.cc/ZG3A-XPUD]). 
2. See Shifting Tides, supra note 1, at 608, 620. 
3. See, e.g., John A. Neuwirth et al., Impact of ‘Trulia’ on Merger Litigation in State and Federal 
Courts, DEL. BUS. CT. INSIDER (Nov. 29, 2017); Jeffrey Wolters & Nathan Emeritz, Delaware 
Litigation 2017: Assessing Trends at Year-End, LAW360 (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.law360.com/
articles/996247/print?section=delaware [https://perma.cc/R4SH-3B8M]. 
4. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 165 (2015) [hereinafter A Great Game ]; Jill Fisch, Sean 
Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An 
Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015); Charles R. Korsmo & Minor 
Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L. J. 829 (2014). 
5. See generally Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Delaware’s 
Takeover Standards, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING 
UP? (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas, eds., 2019) [hereinafter Rise and Fall ]. 
6. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 
7. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). 
8. Id. 
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approved by a fully informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested 
stockholders,” the appropriate standard of review in a post-closing damages action 
is the business judgment rule, rather than enhanced scrutiny under either Revlon9 or 
Unocal.10 In early 2016, the Court of Chancery extended Corwin to provide business 
judgment rule deference to a two-stage merger involving a tender offer, where a 
majority of shares had been voluntarily tendered.11 As a result, class actions seeking 
post-closing damages are effectively a dead letter unless the plaintiff can show a 
deficiency in disclosure that would render the stockholder vote (or decision to 
tender) uninformed.12 
The second prong of the Delaware courts’ response was to target the engine 
that powered the merger litigation crisis: low-value settlements accompanied by 
broad releases. In a series of cases, the Court of Chancery judges began to criticize, 
and ultimately to reject, low-value settlements—particularly those providing only 
additional disclosure, with no financial recovery—accompanied by broad releases 
of liability.13 This judicial antipathy was ultimately formalized in Chancellor 
Bouchard’s January 2016 decision in In re Trulia (Trulia), which rejected a settlement 
providing only additional disclosures and a broad release.14 The Chancellor went on 
to make clear that, going forward, such disclosure-only settlements are disfavored, 
and will only be approved if the additional disclosures are “plainly material” and any 
accompanying release of liability is “narrowly circumscribed.”15 
These developments have, not surprisingly, been greeted with wide acclaim by 
the M&A bar and in the deal-making community generally. Academic critics of 
merger litigation have also, for the most part, welcomed them.16 For example, two 
 
9.   Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). 
10. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
11. In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
12. See Shifting Tides, supra note 1, at 4 (“The net effect of [Corwin and Volcano] was to limit 
substantially the availability of a post-closing suit for damages. Only if the target failed to disclose the 
alleged improprieties prior to shareholder approval of the transaction would the court allow a claim to 
proceed.”). 
13. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at 74–75, In re Aruba 
Networks Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 10765-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015); Transcript of Settlement 
and Hearings of the Court at 14, In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10484-VCG, 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015). As early as 2011, then-Chancellor Strine—now Chief Justice of the Delaware 
Supreme Court—remarked on the anomalous nature of the so-called “disclosure-only” settlement: 
[I]t’s an odd thing about this job that you can award a lot of money to someone for a case 
and award money to an attorney when, in other contexts of the law—no medical malpractice 
plaintiff’s lawyer walks out of cases with money in her pocket and turns on the client and 
says, “Well, remember, you’ve got that explanation about why the doctor made his choice 
in the operating room, and I know you feel a lot better. You don’t have any money, but you 
know why the doctor made the choice he made with the scalpel, and I’ve got a couple 
hundred thousand dollars. 
Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and the Court’s Ruling 
at 30, In re Danvers Bankcorp, Inc. S’holders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 6162-CS (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2011). 
14. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
15. Id. at 898. 
16. The ultimate holding of MFW had been urged years before by several prominent corporate 
law scholars. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders,  
First to Printer_Korsmo (Do Not Delete) 10/29/2019  1:34 PM 
2019] DELAWARE’S RETREAT  59 
of the most prominent scholars of merger litigation, Steven Davidoff Solomon and 
Randall Thomas,17 have recently depicted the move away from heightened 
standards of review as a largely justified response to the changing corporate 
governance environment. They point to three factors in particular: First, the set of 
strong norms for deal practice that has taken root, following the roadmap provided 
by three decades of Delaware case law; second, the rise of institutional and activist 
investors better able to protect themselves through informed voting; and third, the 
increasing prevalence of independent directors, in part spurred by federal securities 
law.18 
In addition to these justifications, some have argued that Corwin does not 
really represent a change in the law at all. Most prominent is the author of the Corwin 
opinion, Chief Justice Strine, himself. The opinion in Corwin is relatively brief and 
portrays itself as a fairly pedestrian application, rather than a re-imagining, of prior 
precedent. In subsequent public statements, as well, the Chief Justice has argued 
that Corwin is simply a straightforward application of long-standing Delaware 
doctrine.19 Under this view, the heightened scrutiny provided by Unocal and Revlon 
was never intended to apply to post-closing damages in the first place. As Chief 
Justice Strine wrote in Corwin, “Unocal and Revlon are primarily designed to give 
stockholders and the Court of Chancery the tool of injunctive relief to address 
important M&A decisions in real time, before closing. They were not tools designed 
with post-closing money damages claims in mind.”20 
Given the amount of commentary Corwin has provoked, the claim that it is 
nothing new is, on its face, difficult to credit.21 It is, however, true that Corwin 
follows directly from MFW. Once you hold that the procedural trappings of an 
arm’s-length deal entitle a majority stockholder squeeze-out to business judgment 
 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 839–40 (2003); Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2,  
60–61 (2005).  
17. See Rise and Fall, supra note 5. Solomon has co-authored a number of influential articles 
chronicling and critiquing the boom in merger litigation. See, e.g., A Great Game, supra note 4; Cain & 
Solomon, supra note 1; Fisch, Griffith & Solomon, supra note 4. Among his many excellent articles on 
merger litigation, a 2004 study co-authored by Thomas first drew attention to the increasing prevalence 
of merger class actions. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder 
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133 (2004). 
18. See Rise and Fall, supra note 5, at 2. 
19. At the 2017 Tulane Corporate Law Institute conference, for example, Chief Justice Strine 
stated that “[i]f you read the footnote in Corwin, where there’s 57 prior cases cited, there’s nothing new 
about this. And it’s nothing new either that it applies to tender offers or to the vote, because the prior 
cases, if you read the old law—the old time religion—if you accepted the benefits of the transaction, 
you could not stultify yourself and then sue on the transaction.” M&A Practice: In a New Age, 17 
M&A J. 1, 4–5 [hereinafter M&A Practice: In a New Age]. 
20. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312 (Del. 2015). 
21. At the 2017 Tulane Corporate Law Institute conference, in reference to Chief Justice 
Strine’s claim that Corwin did not represent a change, the moderator of the next panel—dedicated to 
the aftermath of Corwin—delicately noted that “[w]hile that may be true as a matter of law, I think 
members of the panel would certainly agree that this past year has seen some very, very significant 
developments in Delaware corporate law.” M&A Practice: In a New Age, supra note 19, at 7. 
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rule deference, it would be strange indeed to deny such deference to an actual  
arm’s-length deal.22 But whether MFW itself is a faithful continuation of pre-
existing law is more debatable. It is certainly true that Revlon, Unocal, and their direct 
descendants are not post-closing damages cases, and that Delaware case law is 
surprisingly mum on the standard of review for such cases. This silence, however, 
is largely an artifact of such cases having historically been almost universally 
dismissed or settled before trial.23 It is a mistake to infer too much from this silence. 
In a larger sense, the question of whether or not MFW and Corwin are 
consistent with prior law is of little consequence, except as a window into the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s thinking. As then-Chancellor Strine wrote in MFW, 
“tradition should admittedly not persist if it lacks current value.”24 The real question 
is simply whether business judgment rule deference—making a challenge effectively 
impossible—is warranted whenever a merger has been approved by independent 
directors and a stockholder vote. 
It is not.25 To understand why, it is necessary to consider why merger-related 
decisions merit enhanced scrutiny in the first place. Enhanced scrutiny is necessary 
because the merger context inevitably creates conflicts of interest between 
management and directors on the one hand and stockholders on the other. If these 
conflicts were limited to management’s desire to entrench themselves by fending 
off hostile offers or erecting deal protections around a sale to a favored bidder (the 
situations confronted in Unocal and Revlon) then limiting enhanced scrutiny to the 
pre-closing stage—when defensive measures can be evaluated in real-time—would 
be sensible. But merger-related conflicts are not so contained.  
Two additional conflicts are particularly salient. First is the ever-present risk 
that management will seek to divert as much of the proceeds of the merger as 
 
22. Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster made precisely this point in an article a year before Corwin 
was written. See J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny,  
40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1443 (2014). 
23. Indeed, it is difficult to see how some of the most prominent settlements of recent decades 
could have been reached under Corwin. See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. 6949-CS  
(Del. Ch. 2012) (settling merger-related claims for $110 million); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holder 
Litig., C.A. 6027-VCL (Del. Ch. 2011) (settling merger-related claims that for $89.4 million). Under 
Corwin, the conflicts at issue in El Paso and Del Monte could simply have been disclosed and would have 
been cleansed in the likely event that the stockholders still voted to approve the mergers. 
24. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 527 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
25. Candor compels me to acknowledge at the outset that this conclusion may appear to be in 
tension with the arguments I have made elsewhere that the stockholder class action ought to be 
eliminated altogether. See, e.g., Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition: Replacing 
Class Actions with a Market for Legal Claims, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1323 (2016); Charles R. Korsmo & 
Minor Myers, Competition and the Future of M&A Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 19 (2014). As 
discussed more fully below, my views have not substantially changed. In my prior work, I have argued 
that the merger class action should be eliminated and replaced by either a strengthened appraisal remedy 
or a market for legal claims (via elimination of the contemporaneous ownership requirement). See id. In 
reality, the contemporaneous ownership requirement remains in place, and—as is discussed more fully 
in my recent paper with Minor Myers—Delaware courts have moved to weaken the appraisal remedy 
rather than strengthen it. See Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Flawed Corporate Finance of Dell and 
DFC Global, 68 Emory L.J. 220 (2018). 
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possible to themselves, via employment agreements, change-in-control payments, 
parachute packages, or other transaction-related side-deals. Second is that, even 
leaving aside the possibility of side-payments not available to stockholders, 
management will often have a lower reservation price than diversified public 
stockholders, by virtue of their concentrated economic and human capital 
investments in the firm. As non-diversified investors, managers will be rationally 
risk-averse, and therefore willing to sell the firm at a price below what diversified 
stockholders would hold out for if given the opportunity to negotiate. As discussed 
below, neither of these conflicts is well-suited to regulation by pre-closing 
preliminary injunction. 
Nonetheless, such conflicts only warrant enhanced judicial scrutiny if they 
cannot be policed adequately by other monitors. The conclusion drawn by the 
MFW and Corwin courts is that independent directors and minority stockholders 
can perform such a monitoring function, rendering judicial scrutiny superfluous.  
This conclusion, however, is incorrect. It flies in the face of a substantial body 
of empirical literature on the inefficacy of independent directors as informed and 
motivated monitors of insider misbehavior. It also overstates the cleansing effect of 
a stockholder vote. Fundamentally, a merger vote is typically a Hobson’s  
choice—approve the merger as is or reject it altogether—rather than anything 
resembling a traditional ratification. The stockholders’ judgment that a deal is better 
than no deal should not be mistaken for a judgment that the deal is fair, let alone 
the “best price available,” as Revlon tasked boards with seeking.26 Nor should 
stockholders be presumed to be informed, even in the absence of colorable 
disclosure violations. The rise of institutional shareholding has not substantially 
changed this equation. While institutional investors may be sophisticated, they can 
rarely be considered informed as to fundamental value. Indeed, an increasing 
percentage of shares are held by passive index funds that make little or no attempt 
to assess the value of individual firms. And even active fund managers labor under 
a huge information deficit in relation to the managers who control what information 
will be disclosed in the merger proxy.27 
Nor can we look to industry norms as a bulwark against managerial 
opportunism. It is certainly possible that the deal-making norms built up since the 
1980s will persist even after the legal landscape has shifted to eliminate the 
possibility of post-closing damages. It seems less likely, however, that managers and 
directors were moved to obey these norms by their respect for the wisdom of 
Delaware’s judges than that they were motivated by fear of their sanctions. As that 
fear subsides, it would be naïve to expect these norms to persist unaltered. Indeed, 
early evidence from the post-Corwin era shows that merger premia have fallen to 
 
26. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1985). 
27. See Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 327 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“[O]ne hopes that 
directors and officers can always say that they know more about the company than the company’s 
stockholders—after all, they are paid to know more.”). 
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historic lows, and the percentage of deal value paid out to managers as  
change-of-control payments has spiked.28 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly summarizes the recent surge 
in merger litigation and the crisis atmosphere it created. Part II traces the judicial 
response, primarily in Trulia and a series of cases culminating in MFW and Corwin. 
Part III situates MFW and Corwin in Delaware merger law, and canvasses the main 
justifications for their holdings. Part IV critiques these justifications, concluding 
that these cases represent an unwarranted weakening of judicial scrutiny of merger 
transactions. Part V concludes, offering some suggestions for how to limit the 
damage wrought by Corwin.  
I. THE MERGER LITIGATION CRISIS 
In order to understand the Delaware courts’ recent takeover jurisprudence, it 
is first necessary to get some sense of the context. Accordingly, this Section does 
two things. First, it provides a brief account of the ubiquity of takeover litigation in 
recent years and the character of that litigation.29 Second, it documents the 
increasing evidence that this litigation provided little benefit to stockholders and 
the growing sense that merger litigation was in urgent need of reform.  
A. The Merger Litigation Boom 
Class action lawsuits challenging director actions in acquisitions are not a new 
phenomenon.30 At least since the 1980s, and the landmark cases of Unocal (applying 
enhanced scrutiny to takeover defenses)31 and Revlon (specifying a board’s duty to 
obtain the highest price reasonably available and subjecting their efforts to enhanced 
scrutiny),32 merger challenges have been one of the rare contexts where stockholder 
plaintiffs could hope to avoid application of the highly deferential business 
judgment rule. 
 
28. See Matthew Schoenfeld, The High Cost of Fewer Appraisal Claims in 2017: Premia Down, 
Agency Costs Up, at 4–5 (2017). One should be cautious in interpreting these results. In particular, it is 
possible that both low premia and high change-in-control payments are artifacts of unusually high 
market valuations in 2017. On both metrics, however, 2017 mergers look substantially worse than 
mergers during the last market peak in 2007. See id. at 4. 
29. For a more complete discussion of the historical data on takeover litigation, see A Great 
Game, supra note 4; Shifting Tides, supra note 1; and Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, 
Takeover Litigation in 2015 ( Jan. 14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Berkeley Center 
for Law, Business and the Economy), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 [https://perma.cc/5YNQ-
UGNU]. Much of the data presented in this section is drawn from these sources. 
30. See A Great Game, supra note 4, at 111 (“Takeover litigation has existed for some time in 
Delaware.”). 
31. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“Because of the 
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests [by enacting takeover 
defenses], rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which 
calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may 
be conferred.”); Rise and Fall, supra note 5, at 3 (Unocal “held that such defensive actions would be 
subject to a heightened standard of review.”). 
32. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1985). 
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Earlier data is scarce, but an influential study found that by the turn of the 
century, “the vast bulk” of state court stockholder litigation consisted of “class 
actions against public companies challenging director action in an acquisition.”33 At 
the time, the authors of the study were cautiously optimistic about this 
development. On the one hand, they found some of the classic markers of litigation 
agency costs, suggesting the litigation may have been serving the interests of the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers more than the interests of the stockholders.34 On the other hand, 
they found that—unlike with securities fraud class actions—a substantial number 
of merger cases led to meaningful monetary settlements, and that these settlements 
appeared to correlate with the potential merit of the claims.35 
Optimism faded, however, in the face of subsequent developments. In early 
2012, Matthew Cain and Steven Davidoff Solomon released a working paper 
documenting a recent, and massive, increase in the incidence of merger litigation.36 
As late as 2007, fewer than 40% of transactions (96 of 248) were challenged by a 
fiduciary duty class action.37 This volume of litigation may already have been 
excessive—that so many mergers might involve culpable breaches of fiduciary duty 
strains credulity. Nonetheless, the fact that most mergers went unchallenged 
suggests at least some degree of restraint and discrimination on the part of plaintiff’s 
lawyers. This restraint did not last. By 2009, Cain and Solomon found 85% of 
transactions (62 out of 73) faced at least one suit.38 By 2011, the proportion had 
reached 92% (117 out of 127), with an average of five lawsuits being brought against 
each transaction.39 The inescapable conclusion was that merger challenges were 




33. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder  
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 137 (2004). 
34. See id. at 138 (“For example, in most cases multiple lawsuits with virtually identical 
complaints are quickly filed, usually within a few days of the announcement of the proposed acquisition. 
Over 75 percent of the time, the cases are filed by a small, well-defined group of plaintiff’s law firms 
in the name of a professional cadre of plaintiff shareholders.”). 
35. See id. (“[W]e find that there were large monetary settlements paid to shareholders in  
many of these cases . . . .”); id. at 138–39 (“Furthermore, beneficial settlements…are concentrated  
in cases where a majority shareholder is squeezing out minority public shareholders on  
disadvantageous terms . . . [and] are more likely to occur in cases where the initial offer price was 
substantially lower . . . .”). 
36. The working paper would ultimately become A Great Game, supra note 4. 
37. Id. at 112. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 112–13. 
40. Even prominent plaintiffs’ attorneys, while counseling against drastic reforms, admitted that 
“it is troubling that a majority of public corporation mergers results in a lawsuit.” Mark Lebovitch & 
Jeroen Van Kwawegen, Of Babies and Bathwater: Deterring Frivolous Stockholder Suits Without Closing 
the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate Claims, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 491 (2016). 
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B. The Building Consensus for Change 
The disposition of these (suddenly ubiquitous) merger claims gave a clue to 
the incentives that drove them. Approximately 28% of such claims were dismissed 
in one form or another.41 The remaining 72% were all settled, without a single case 
from Cain and Solomon’s sample proceeding to final judgment.42 Of the settled 
cases, nearly 80% were so-called “disclosure only” settlements, where the only relief 
for the stockholders is an agreement by the parties to the merger to provide 
additional or corrected disclosures.43 Despite the lack of financial relief, such 
settlements resulted in an average of $750,000 being awarded to the plaintiff’s 
attorneys. In only a handful of cases, from a sample covering seven years and 
hundreds of cases, did the plaintiff’s attorney even claim that the suit had resulted 
in additional cash for stockholders.44 
The incentives for the plaintiff’s lawyers were obvious enough, but the system 
had something in it for defendants, as well. As Professors Griffith and Lahav 
pointed out, this indiscriminate pattern of litigation benefited defendants by 
allowing them to secure global releases of all potential fiduciary claims at relatively 
low cost—less than the cost of actually litigating even a frivolous claim.45 As a result, 
frivolous claims abounded and potentially meritorious claims were sold off to the 
lowest bidder via a cheap settlement.46 This was a “great game,” indeed—a dynamic 
that Chief Justice Strine recently referred to as “stinky-as-cheese.”47  
Cain and Solomon’s working paper quickly became a minor sensation,48 
prompting articles in the mainstream press calling attention to the problem of 
merger litigation.49 It was also referenced in a parade of publications by prominent 
M&A law firms50 and was the centerpiece of a paper issued by the U.S. Chamber 
 
41. A Great Game, supra note 4, at 115. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id.  
45. Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation,  
66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1057–58 (2013). 
46. As James Cox and Randall Thomas have observed, faced with the risks and costs of 
litigation, risk-averse plaintiffs’ attorneys may be tempted to settle meritorious cases for too little. See 
Cox and Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1593 (“[A] settlement offer 
that provided recovery of the attorney’s tangible and opportunity costs could loom larger than the 
prospect of aggressively pursuing the action to a more lucrative prospective judgment or settlement.”). 
This incentive to settle quickly is exacerbated by the possibility that a duplicate claim brought in another 
jurisdiction may result in a settlement and release, with the fee award going to another firm. 
47.  M&A Practice: In a New Age, supra note 19. 
48. Or whatever the legal academia equivalent of a “sensation” is—it was not exactly 
Beatlemania.  
49. See, e.g., Allison Frankel, Must Read: Deal Prof’s Study of Competition for M&A Litigation, 
REUTERS ( Jan. 17, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/01/17/must-read-deal-
profs-study-of-competition-for-ma-litigation [https://perma.cc/3YSW-AXKA]. 
50. See, e.g., Adam O. Emmerich & Trevor S. Norwitz, An Antidote to Multiforum Shareholder 
Litigation, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 
2014 (8th ed.). 
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of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform advocating for restrictions on merger 
litigation, which it called a “merger tax” imposed by plaintiff’s lawyers.51 
Understandably, these critics focused on the most obvious problem revealed by 
Cain and Solomon’s data—the manifest proliferation of nuisance litigation. The 
Chamber of Commerce paper, which is characteristic of the criticism, argued that 
recent merger litigation represented “extortion through litigation,” threatening to 
“obstruct[ ] economically beneficial transactions,” and demanded Congressional 
action.52 With a few notable exceptions,53 the second problem suggested by the 
data—that meritorious claims were buried in the avalanche of nuisance claims and 
settled cheaply rather than being litigated diligently—was rarely a focus.54 
By the time a subsequent study found that the additional disclosures resulting 
from merger litigation provided, on average, no meaningful benefit to 
stockholders,55 Delaware courts had already begun openly questioning the value of 
much of the merger litigation being filed, and commentators were arguing that 
merger litigation was fundamentally broken.56 The ensuing judicial pushback is 
described in the next Section. 
 
51. See The Trial Lawyers’ New Merger Tax: Corporate Mergers and the Mega Million-Dollar 
Litigation Toll on Our Economy, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Oct. 24, 2012), http://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/the-trial-lawyers-new-merger-tax-corporate-mergers-and-
the-mega-million-dollar-litigation-toll-on-our-economy [https://perma.cc/KKZ5-DZU5]. 
52. Id. at 1. 
53. See Griffith & Lahav, supra note 45; see also Joel E. Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposes 
the Systemic Problem of Disclosure Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 878 (2015) (warning that meritorious 
cases may be settled too cheaply). 
54. Post-Trulia developments suggest that this second dynamic (high-value claims being settled 
and released too cheaply) may be at least as important as the first (low-value claims being settled for 
nuisance value) in driving merger litigation. Around the same time as Trulia, the Delaware legislature 
formally allowed corporations to enact forum-selection bylaws by simple board action. Such bylaws 
could, for example, require any stockholder suit to be brought in Delaware. Post-Trulia, however, 
defendants have not, for the most part, used forum-selection bylaws to block the migration of merger 
litigation to non-Delaware jurisdictions. This suggests that defendants value the ability to secure the 
kind of low-cost release of claims no longer tolerated in Delaware. See, e.g., William B. Chandler III & 
Anthony A. Rickey, The Trouble with Trulia: Re-evaluating the Case for Fee-Shifting Bylaws as a 
Solution to the Overlitigation of Corporate Claims (Apr. 4, 2017) (working paper); Sean J. Griffith, 
Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection 
Provisions Can’t 2 (Fordham Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2855950) (noting that “defense 
counsel must be seen as complicit in the out-of-Delaware dynamic because they have failed to exercise 
Exclusive Forum bylaws to bring the litigation back to Delaware.”). 
55. See Fisch et al., supra note 4. (finding that, on average, additional disclosures from such 
settlements had no discernible effect of subsequent stockholder voting and concluding that these 
settlements were of no value). 
56. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound,  
40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 851, 852 (2016) (referring to deal litigation as a “problem [that] has reached crisis 
proportions”); Marc Wolinsky & Ben Schireson, Deal Litigation Run Amok: Diagnosis and Prescriptions, 
47 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 1, 1 (Jan 8, 2014) (arguing that “the system is broken, that shareholder 
suits are being filed regardless of the merits, and that shareholder plaintiffs are imposing a dead weight 
on society”). 
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II. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE MERGER LITIGATION BOOM 
The Delaware judiciary’s response to the merger litigation boom has consisted 
of two prongs, which have each developed over a period of years, largely 
independent of one another. First, in a series of cases culminating in Trulia, the 
Court of Chancery has gradually imposed greater scrutiny on merger litigation 
settlements, ultimately refusing to approve settlements that do not provide clear 
benefits to stockholders. Second, in a series of cases culminating in Corwin, the 
Delaware Supreme Court has weakened substantive scrutiny of directors’  
merger-related decisions, providing a deferential business judgment rule standard of 
review where certain procedural safeguards are in place. These judicial 
developments are summarized in this Section.  
A. The Road to Trulia 
Because merger class actions are representative suits, the court must approve 
settlements.57 As a result, it has always been possible for a presiding judge to reject 
the kind of low-value or collusive settlements that fueled the merger boom. And, in 
fact, Delaware judges have for years complained about and criticized the merger 
litigation settlements that have come before them.58 The judges’ comments at 
settlement hearings suggest they were well aware of the pathologies developing in 
merger litigation well before they had been fully documented in academic 
scholarship.  
 
57. See, e.g., In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. S’holder Litig., WL 2438067, at *12 (Del. Ch. May 21, 
2015) (concluding that the potential divergence between the personal interests of the attorneys 
conducting the litigation and the interests of the class or corporation they represent means that “the 
Court of Chancery must . . . play the role of fiduciary in its review of these settlements.” (quoting In re 
Resorts Int’l S’holders Litig. Appeals, 570 A.2d 259, 266 (Del. 1990))); In re Nat’l City Corp. S’holders 
Litig., C.A. No. 4123-CC, 2009 WL 2425389, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2009) (“The Delaware Supreme 
Court has unequivocally held that, where plaintiffs and defendants agree upon fees in settlement of a 
class action lawsuit, a trial court ‘must make an independent determination of reasonableness’ of the 
agreed to fees.” (quoting Goodrich v. E.F. Button Grp., Inc., 681 A.2d 1039, 1045–46 (Del. 1996))). 
58. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 33, Roffe v. Eagle Rock Energy GP, L.P.,  
C.A. 5258-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (likening settlements providing a release of claims in exchange 
for additional disclosures to “using [the] Court to facilitate the sale of indulgences, . . . excusing the 
defendants from any of their actual or potential sins.”); Transcript of Courtroom Status Conference at 
19, Scully v. Nighthawk Radiology, C.A. No. 5890-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2010) (explaining that 
“plaintiffs’ lawyers have been subjected to criticism for the practice of suing on the announcement of 
every deal, then agreeing to global disclosure statements. I’ve criticized you all for it. My colleagues have 
criticized you all for it.”); Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 14, In re Monogram Biosciences,  
Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 4703-CC (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2010) (noting the “continuing pattern of 
people just challenging deals, basically raising sort of increasingly marginal disclosure claims . . . [a]nd 
then . . . settl[ing] at the original price”); Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 25, Smith v. Curagen Corp.,  
C.A. No. 4670-VCS (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2009) (noting the pattern of low-value merger litigation and 
concluding that “[t]he incentive system that that creates is not, in my view, wholesome”). 
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Nonetheless, until very recently the Court of Chancery was hesitant to reject 
settlements that all parties appearing before the court favored,59 even when the 
perverse incentives fostered by such settlements were fairly clear.60 As of 2013, a 
researcher was able to find “only a few instances where the Court refused to 
approve a disclosure-only settlement.”61 Instead of rejecting settlements outright, 
the typical pattern was for the judge to grumble about the low-value relief and broad 
release, but nonetheless approve the settlement after awarding the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys somewhat lower fees than requested.62 
Only in 2015 did the Court of Chancery begin to take decisive action to change 
the settlement dynamic in merger litigation. In September of that year, Vice 
Chancellor Glasscock was faced with approving or rejecting a disclosure-only 
settlement resolving litigation challenging the acquisition of Riverbed Technology.63 
The Vice Chancellor initially followed the traditional pattern. He characterized the 
benefit to the class as “a peppercorn, a positive result of small therapeutic value,” 
and noted that “the breadth of the release is troubling.”64 Nonetheless, he ultimately 
approved the settlement—after knocking the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ award down to 
$300,000 from a requested $500,000. In this regard, the case resembled so many 
that went before it. Glasscock then, however, fired a shot across the bow of merger 
litigants. First, he emphasized that he was only approving the settlement because 
the parties had clearly proceeded in “reasonable reliance . . . on formerly settled 
practice in this Court.”65 The Vice Chancellor, however, then put litigants on notice 
that they should not do so going forward. He noted “that this [reliance]  
factor . . . will be diminished or eliminated going forward in light of this 
 
59. As Henry Friendly remarked, “[o]nce a settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the plaintiff 
stockholders link arms with their former adversaries to defend [their] joint handiwork.” Alleghany  
Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting). 
60. See Transcript of Motion for Class Certification, Settlement and Attorneys’ Fees and the 
Court’s Ruling at 37, Becker v. Am. Commercial Lines Inc., C.A. No. 5919-VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 
2011) (“Historically, we have tried to err on the side of allowing defendants to dispose of weak cases 
by entering into [disclosure only] settlements like this. I think, certainly, the Chancellor [Strine] and I 
have commented on the potentially bad incentives that that creates systemically in terms of encouraging 
people to file suit on these types of actions and in terms of allowing defendants to obtain broad releases 
in these types of actions.”).  
61. See Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee Awards: The Delaware Court of Chancery’s 
Answer to Incentivizing Disclosure-Only Settlements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 669, 675 n.22 (2013). Sumpter 
cites only two such cases. See In re SS & C Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 911 A.2d 816 (Del. Ch. 2006); 
In re FLS Holdings, Inc. S’holders Litig., 1993 WL 104562 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 1993). In both cases, the 
settlements were rejected, in part, for failure to demonstrate diligent investigation of potentially 
meritorious claims. 
62. See Sumpter, supra note 61, at 704–28 (describing the dynamics behind fee awards in merger 
litigation). 
63. See In re Riverbed Tech., Inc., S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10484-VCG (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 
2015). 
64. Id. at *5–6. 
65. Id. at *6. 
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Memorandum Opinion and other decisions of this Court.”66 In doing so, he 
indicated that what was “formerly settled practice” was not likely to remain so in 
the future.  
Only three weeks later, Vice Chancellor Laster went a step further, actually 
rejecting a proposed settlement of litigation arising out of the acquisition of Aruba 
Networks by Hewlett-Packard, and then dismissing the case entirely on grounds of 
inadequate representation of counsel.67 Again, the Vice Chancellor criticized the 
pairing of minimally useful disclosure for stockholders and broad global releases of 
liability for defendants.68 
By this point, it was clear that something had to give, and the final step came 
in January of 2016, in the form of Chancellor Bouchard’s decision in Trulia. In it, 
the Chancellor fingered the courts’ practice of approving disclosure-only 
settlements as one of the driving “dynamics that ha[s] fueled disclosure settlements 
of deal litigation”69 and announced an intent to put an end to these dynamics by 
applying greater scrutiny to such settlements going forward. Bouchard cautioned 
attorneys to “expect that disclosure settlements are likely to be met with continued 
disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly material 
misrepresentation or omission.”70 He emphasized that by “plainly material,” he 
meant “that it should not be a close call.”71 Bouchard also emphasized that 
settlements would not be approved unless “the subject matter of the proposed 
release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass nothing more than the disclosure 
claims and fiduciary duty claims concerning the sale process, if the record shows 
that such claims have been investigated sufficiently.”72 
B. The Road to Corwin 
The Delaware courts have spent much of the past few decades slowly 
retreating from the intensified scrutiny of merger-related decisions promised by 
seminal 1980s cases like Weinberger, Unocal, Van Gorkom, and Revlon.73  
 
66. Id. (citing In re Susser Holdings Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 9613-VCG  
(Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2015); Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., C.A. No. 9730-VCL (Del. Ch. July 8, 
2015); In re Intermune, Inc., S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10086-VCN (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015)). 
67. In re Aruba Networks, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 10765-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015). 
68. Vice Chancellor Laster suggested that the type of “reliance interest in past practice” that 
may have applied in Riverbed did not apply, given his own prior record of aggressively questioning 
disclosure-only settlements accompanied by broad releases. Id.  
69. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d 884, 894 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
70. Id. at 898. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. See Rise and Fall, supra note 5, at 5 (“[T]he courts gradually backed away from the 
interventionist approach and new standards of the 1980s. The result over a 25-year period spanning 
from the 1990s until today are clear, a wholesale change in the application and use of these standards.”). 
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Unocal was the first to be scaled back by the judiciary.74 As originally 
conceived, Unocal doctrine promised substantial scrutiny of management’s use of 
defensive tactics in the face of a hostile bid, requiring the board to demonstrate 1) 
that the hostile bid presented a threat to the corporation and 2) that the defensive 
measures were reasonable and proportionate to that threat.75 As applied, however, 
these two prongs have become increasingly easy for boards to satisfy. First, in 
Paramount Communications Co. v. Time, Inc.,76 the Delaware Supreme Court 
recognized “substantive coercion” as a justification for defensive action, ensuring 
that boards could easily satisfy the first requirement of Unocal by simply declaring 
the hostile offer inadequate.77 The second prong of Unocal was also later weakened, 
most prominently in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., which adopted a 
deferential approach to assessing proportionality.78 By 2001, Professors Gordon 
Smith and Robert Thompson could survey the relevant case law and judged that 
Unocal was “a dead letter.”79 This judgment was vindicated in 2011, when 
Chancellor Chandler (reluctantly) refused to order redemption of a poison pill even 
in the face of a hostile offer that stockholders manifestly and reasonably regarded 
as fair.80 
The Revlon doctrine, too, has become notably weaker over time, most 
prominently in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan.81 In Revlon itself, the Delaware 
Supreme Court applied Unocal’s “enhanced scrutiny” to the target board’s efforts 
to get “the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company,”82 with a focus 
 
74. Van Gorkom, of course, was met by rapid legislative action in the form of Sec. 102(b)(7), 
allowing corporations to adopt charter provisions exculpating directors from monetary liability for 
breaches of the duty of care. Virtually all public corporations have adopted such provisions. See 
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 490, 497–503 (2000) 
(finding that ninety-eight out of a sample of 100 Fortune 500 companies had adopted such provisions, 
including all fifty-nine Delaware-incorporated companies in the sample).  
75. See Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
76. Paramount Commc’ns Co. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
77. See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder  
Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 291 (“[T]he Delaware Supreme Court 
sanctioned the use of defensive mechanisms in the face of an offer at a price perceived to be inadequate. 
By approving substantive coercion as a rationale for defensive action, the court ensured that directors 
would always carry their burden of proof on the first prong of the Unocal framework.”). 
78. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). In Unitrin, the court held that 
defensive measures would be found to be proportionate unless they were 1) coercive or preclusive, or 
2) outside the range of reasonableness. Id. at 1386–88. In practice, defensive measures have been found 
proportionate under Unitrin unless they render even a proxy contest essentially impossible. See 
Thompson & Smith, supra note 77, at 286 (referring to Unocal as “a dead letter” in the wake of Unitrin). 
79. See Thompson & Smith, supra note 77, at 286.  
80. See Air Prod. and Chems. Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). In defense of the 
target board’s actions, it should be noted that their strategy proved successful, with the company 
ultimately being acquired in 2016 for more than twice the amount of the hostile offer. See Leslie Picker, 
Why Airgas Was Finally Sold, for $10 Billion Instead of $5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2016),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/business/dealbook/why-airgas-was-finally-sold-for-10-
billion-instead-of-5-billion.html [https://perma.cc/D77B-HDAP]. 
81. Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). 
82. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985). 
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on the “reasonableness and purpose” of the board’s actions.83 While Lyondell 
retained Revlon’s language of “enhanced scrutiny” and “reasonableness,” the court 
examined the challenged conduct through a lens of good faith, emphasizing that it 
would not second guess the reasoned judgment of the board even in the pre-closing 
period.84 
It is the weakening of Weinberger, however, that led most directly to MFW, 
and then Corwin. The Weinberger court applied an entire fairness standard to a 
controlling stockholder squeeze-out, requiring the defendant directors to 
demonstrate that the transaction was entirely fair to minority stockholders.85 Entire 
fairness review makes it difficult to dispose of a claim early in the process, and 
dealmakers have long searched for procedural safe harbors to gain more deferential 
review, even before the twenty-first century boom in merger litigation. This effort 
bore early fruit in 1985 in Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil, where the court held that “approval 
of a merger, as here, by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders, 
while not a legal prerequisite, shifts the burden of proving the unfairness of the 
merger entirely to the plaintiffs.”86 This principle was extended again in 1994 in 
Kahn v. Lynch,87 where the court additionally allowed the burden to be shifted to the 
plaintiffs if an empowered committee of independent directors approved the 
transaction.88  
Though the Lynch court was not confronted with a scenario where both 
safeguards were in place, it nowhere acknowledged the possibility of anything other 
than entire fairness as a standard of review. Indeed, the Lynch court referred to the 
“policy rationale which requires judicial review of interested cash-out mergers 
exclusively for entire fairness.”89 Ultimately, while Rosenblatt and Lynch’s shifting the 
burden of proof to the plaintiffs was certainly a benefit to defendants, it did little to 
alter the fundamental litigation dynamics. Even with the burden of proof on the 
plaintiffs, the application of entire fairness made claims difficult to dispose of early, 
allowing plaintiffs to impose substantial discovery costs and giving even frivolous 
suits substantial settlement value.90 
 
83. Id. at 180. 
84. See Rise and Fall, supra note 5, at 6 (“Once again, the court had removed itself from a more 
searching scrutiny, instead preferring in this instance to subsume Revlon within the general fiduciary 
duty of loyalty and its standard of good faith.”); Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 209 (2014) (“Both the actual words and the clear ‘music’ of the Lyondell 
opinion imposed a demanding liability standard for challenging director conduct in the Revlon setting.”). 
85. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (“The requirement of fairness 
is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of 
establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”). 
86. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil, 493 A.2d 929, 929 (1985). 
87. Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 1117. 
90. See In re MFW S’holders Litig. , 67 A.3d 496, 534 (“[A]bsent the ability of defendants to 
bring an effective motion to dismiss, every case has settlement value, not for merits reasons, but because 
the cost of paying an attorneys’ fee to settle litigation and obtain a release . . . exceeds the cost in terms 
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Over the past two decades, the Delaware courts have gradually expanded the 
availability of such safe harbors. Initially this took place in the context of tender 
offers, partly on the grounds the board had less of a gatekeeping function in tender 
offers.91 Eventually, however, the Court of Chancery questioned the wisdom of 
applying two different standards in the functionally similar tender offer and 
statutory merger contexts.92  
In a series of opinions, the Court of Chancery sought to harmonize the law of 
squeeze-outs by building on the framework created by Lynch. Instead of simply 
shifting the burden of proof for adopting one of two procedural safeguards—and 
providing no additional incentive to adopt both safeguards—the Court of Chancery 
began arguing for full business judgment rule deference to squeeze-outs where a 
controlling stockholder agreed to have their offer conditioned on approval by both 
an independent committee and a majority of the minority stockholder vote. This 
standard was put forward initially in pure dicta in Cox Communications.93 It was 
subsequently employed in several cases but not found to apply under the facts of 
those cases.94 
This line of case law finally culminated in MFW. In MFW, the controlling 
stockholder of MFW took the company private via a squeeze-out merger.95 The 
controller, however, had stipulated at the beginning of negotiations that it would 
“not move forward with the transaction unless it [was] approved by . . . a special 
committee” of independent directors.96 The controller also specified at the outset 
that the squeeze-out would be “subject to a non-waivable condition requiring the 
approval of a majority of the” minority shares.97  
In MFW, then-Chancellor Strine first noted that Lynch had not confronted a 
situation involving both an independent committee and a majority of the minority 
condition.98 Chancellor Strine then engaged in a wide-ranging analysis of the 
 
of dollars and time consumed of going through the discovery process under a standard of review in 
which a substantive review of financial fairness is supposedly inescapable.”). 
91. See, e.g., In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787  
(Del. Ch. June 19, 2001). 
92. See, e.g., In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig. 836 A.2d 531, 547 (Del. Ch. 2003) (referring to the 
disparity in treatment as “passing strange”); In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 435 
(Del. Ch. 2002) (noting the potential incoherence of treating economically similar transactions 
differently). 
93. See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 606 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
94. See, e.g., In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 400 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re John 
Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 758-CC, 2009 WL 3165613, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009). 
95. MFW, 67 A.3d at 499. 
96. Id. at 506. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 522 (“[T]he Supreme Court was only asked to determine what the standard of review 
was when a merger was approved by a special committee, not by a special committee and a non-waivable 
majority-of-the-minority vote.”). Strine admitted that “there is broad language in [Lynch and other 
precedents] that can be read to control the question,” but concluded that the “question remains an 
open one.” Id. at 524. 
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relevant policy considerations at play in deciding the proper standard of review.99 I 
evaluate these considerations more fully in the next two Sections. In short, however, 
Strine concluded that a structure featuring both protections “replicates the  
arm’s-length merger . . . by ‘requir[ing] two independent approvals, which it is fair 
to say serve independent integrity-enforcing functions.’”100 As a result, the business 
judgment rule would be invoked if the controller conditioned the transaction on 
approval of both an empowered, independent special committee and a majority of 
the minority, where there is no inference that the committee failed to meet its duty 
of care or that the stockholders were uninformed or coerced.101 Amid some 
suspense, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed MFW, treating the issue as one of 
first impression and largely adopting the Chancellor’s reasoning.102  
With MFW settled, the treatment of mergers not involving a controlling 
stockholder was largely a fait accompli.103 If the business judgment rule applied when 
a controlling stockholder squeeze-out mimicked the trappings of a third-party deal, 
then surely it would also apply to an actual third-party deal.104 The predictable result 
came the next year in Corwin, which, in comparison to MFW, is a fairly brief and 
cursory opinion. Corwin involved the acquisition of KKR Financial Holdings by 
KKR in a stock-for-stock merger.105 The transaction was approved by a stockholder 
vote.106 While the plaintiffs alleged that KKR functioned as a controller despite its 
small stock holdings, the Court of Chancery found that the target board was 
independent, and the Supreme Court found no reason to disagree.107  
In the lower court, the primary dispute (other than the question of whether 
KKR should be treated as a controlling stockholder) was over whether Revlon was 
triggered by the stock-for-stock merger and enhanced scrutiny thereby applied.108 
The Supreme Court, however, found that Revlon was irrelevant because the 
informed stockholder vote in favor of the merger invoked the business judgment 
rule as the appropriate standard of review, insulating against anything but a claim 
 
99.   Id. at 524–36. 
100. Id. at 528 (quoting Cox, 879 A.2d at 618). 
101. Id. at 535. Chancellor Strine noted that dissenting stockholders could still challenge the 
price via an appraisal action. Id. 
102. See generally Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). 
103. Indeed, Vice Chancellor Laster suggested in a 2014 article, shortly after MFW, that “[a]s a 
matter of first principles, in a situation where enhanced scrutiny applies, stockholder approval by a 
disinterested, uncoerced, and fully informed stockholder majority should restore the business judgment 
rule.” Laster, supra note 22, at 1444. 
104. It is worth noting that the result in MFW begs the question of the proper standard of 
review in post-closing damages actions for third-party deals. If the proper standard for a third-party 
deal were Revlon-style enhanced scrutiny, the MFW court should have imposed that standard rather 
than the business judgment rule in exchange for adopting the procedural trappings of a third-party deal. 
105. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 306 (Del. 2015). 
106. In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 988–89 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
107. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 307–08. 
108. Id. at 308; see also Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151–52 (Del. 2016) (clarifying that 
plaintiffs can only challenge such a transaction on the basis that it constitutes waste). 
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for waste.109 Thus, the court concluded that approval by an “uncoerced, informed 
stockholder vote is outcome-determinative, even if Revlon applied to the merger.”110 
Because the transaction was not coercive, and because the plaintiffs did not allege 
that the stockholder vote was uninformed, the business judgment rule applied, and 
the case was at an end. 
Following Corwin, it is now clear that a transaction “not subject to the entire 
fairness standard” will be reviewed under the business judgment rule standard for 
the purposes of a post-closing damages action “when the disinterested stockholders 
have had the free and informed chance to decide on the economic merits of a 
transaction for themselves.”111 Corwin has since been extended to apply to two-stage 
mergers under 251(h).112 As a result, the prospects of succeeding in a post-closing 
damages action are now exceedingly dim. The only plausible path to liability—or 
even discovery—is via allegations of disclosure violations. 113 For reasons discussed 
below, however, this is rarely a promising approach. 
III. THE RATIONALES FOR MFW AND CORWIN  
In the previous Section, I introduced the holdings of Trulia, MFW, and 
Corwin. Trulia has largely been welcomed as providing long-overdue adult 
supervision to the disclosure-only settlements that drove the merger boom.114 It 
manifestly blocks low-value merger litigation without foreclosing the possibility of 
high-value suits. While many have noted that Trulia, standing alone, is not a 
 
109. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 306.  
110. Id. at 308. 
111. Id. at 312–13. 
112. In re Volcano Corp. S’holder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 741 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Stockholder 
acceptance of a tender offer pursuant to a Section 251(h) merger has the same cleansing effect as a 
stockholder vote in favor of a transaction.”). 
113. The ability to bring a waste claim is largely illusory, given that a claim that informed, 
uncoerced stockholders approved a wasteful transaction will generally be implausible on its face. See 
Singh, 137 A.3d at 153 (noting that “the vestigial waste exception has long had little real-world relevance, 
because it has been understood that stockholders would be unlikely to approve a transaction that is 
wasteful”) (internal citations omitted). 
114. See, e.g., Chandler III & Rickey, supra note 54, at 1 (noting that Trulia was “widely seen as 
a promising corrective to the problem of excessive corporate litigation”). Commentators had long called 
for greater judicial policing of collusive settlements, while noting that litigation dynamics made such 
policing unlikely. See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 46, at 1594 (“[T]he presiding judge, overwhelmed 
by a crowded docket and poorly armed against the possible self-interest of the attorneys who promoted 
the suit’s settlement, was not capable of effectively protecting the interests of the class.”); Korsmo & 
Myers, supra note 4, at 842 (“In practice . . . a busy judge is understandably reluctant to reject a settlement 
that all parties before the court are pressing the court to accept.”). Cox and Thomas did note, however, 
that judges already possessed the necessary tools to police stockholder litigation, even if they did not 
always have the incentives to use them. Id. The Delaware State Bar Association evidently agreed. When 
tasked with making a recommendation on whether to allow corporations to adopt bylaws forcing 
plaintiffs to bear the corporation’s litigation costs for an unsuccessful suit, they recommended not 
allowing such bylaws, at least partly because the problem of excessive stockholder litigation could be 
adequately controlled by “increase[d] judicial confidence to use the tools available to supervise 
stockholder litigation more effectively.” DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF 
COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 9 (2015). 
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panacea,115 I am unaware of any serious criticism of the decision itself, or the 
standard it announced for approving settlements.  
MFW and Corwin, while still largely welcomed, are not as self-evidently 
positive developments.116 Certainly the decisions have occasioned some gnashing 
of teeth among the Delaware plaintiff’s bar. Indeed, in the next Section, I will 
conclude that a little teeth-gnashing is appropriate—MFW and Corwin are likely to 
do more harm than good.117 Preparatory to this criticism, it is necessary to consider 
in more detail the justifications proffered for the holdings, both in the opinions 
themselves and by supporters of their outcome.  
While the two cases obviously address somewhat different situations, they 
involve overlapping justifications. These justifications fall into eight major 
categories, which also unavoidably overlap somewhat. First, that Corwin does not 
represent a change at all but is simply an application of longstanding principle. 
Second, relatedly, that the enhanced scrutiny of Revlon and Unocal was never 
intended to apply to post-closing claims. Third, that deferring to informed directors 
and stockholders is in keeping with the core reasoning underlying the business 
judgment rule. Fourth, that boards and stockholders have less need for judicial 
scrutiny due to the increasing prevalence of independent directors and institutional 
investors. Fifth, that MFW creates an incentive for controlling stockholders to 
employ beneficial procedural protections. Sixth, that the cleansing power of a 
stockholder vote is an application of general principles of ratification. Seventh, that 
dissenters can still avail themselves of the appraisal remedy. Eighth, that merger 
litigation does not provide any substantial benefits in the first place. 
I introduce each of these justifications briefly in this Section and critique each 






115. The main concern is that Trulia can be evaded by filing the merger challenge outside of 
Delaware, in jurisdictions still willing to approve disclosure-only settlements. See, e.g., Chandler III & 
Rickey, supra note 54, at 2 (“Although Delaware courts have acted to rein in disclosure settlements, few 
courts in other jurisdictions have followed suit.”); Griffith, supra note 54, at 2 (documenting the 
migration of merger litigation to non-Delaware jurisdictions and concluding that hopes that Trulia had 
solved the merger litigation problem once and for all “now appear to have been wishful thinking”). 
116. See, e.g., Daniel Wilson, Desirable Resistance: Kahn v. M&F Worldwide and the Fight for the 
Business Judgment Rule in Going-Private Mergers, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 643, 644 (2015) (characterizing 
Chancellor Strine’s decision in MFW as “controversial”).  
117. See infra Part IV. 
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A. That “Old-Time Religion” 
The first and most straightforward defense of Corwin is that it is simply a 
continuation of long-standing Delaware practice, and not a change in the law at 
all.118 Chief Justice Strine, the author of the Corwin opinion, has been particularly 
adamant on this point. At a 2017 conference, he implored those alarmed by Corwin 
to “read the old law—the old time religion” and noted that “[i]f you read the 
footnote in Corwin, where there’s 57 prior cases cited, there’s nothing new about 
this.”119 While fifty-seven is a bit of hyperbole, it is certainly the case that both the 
Supreme Court and Chancery opinions cite a large number of cases, including such 
well-known warhorses as Wheelabrator120 and Stroud v. Grace.121  
Indeed, the footnote to which Strine was referring cites no fewer than sixteen 
cases—stretching back as far as 1928—for varying versions of the broad 
proposition that stockholder approval of an action or transaction can result in 
business judgment rule deference.122 For good measure, the footnote also throws in 
a cite to an article by former Chancellor William Allen (now counsel at Wachtell, 
Lipton, Rosen & Katz) for the more specific contention that “a fully informed 
majority vote of the disinterested stockholders that approves a transaction (other 
than a merger with a controlling stockholder) has the effect of insulating the 
directors from all claims except waste.”123 
B. Enhanced Scrutiny Intended Only for Pre-Closing Claims 
An extension of the argument that Corwin does not represent a change in the 
law is that Unocal and Revlon never called for enhanced scrutiny in a post-closing 
damages action, following stockholder approval of a merger. Then-Chancellor 
Strine strongly implied this in his MFW opinion, arguing that, under Unocal and 
Revlon, “when arm’s-length cash mergers were approved by fully informed, 
uncoerced votes of the disinterested stockholders, the business judgment rule 
standard of review was applied to any class-action claim for monetary relief based 
on the inadequacy of the merger price.”124  
This conclusion was restated more explicitly in the Supreme Court’s Corwin 
opinion, which concluded that “Unocal and Revlon are primarily designed to give 
 
118. The same, of course, cannot be said of MFW, which both the Court of Chancery and the 
Supreme Court treated as a matter of first impression, and where both acknowledged the potential 
tension with prior case law. See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 524 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(“Admittedly, there is broad language in [earlier cases] that can be read to control the question asked in 
this case.”); Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642 (Del. 2014) (noting that “[t]his appeal 
presents a question of first impression”). 
119.  M&A Practice: In a New Age, supra note 19, at 45 (2017). 
120. In re Wheelabrator Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
121. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992). 
122. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 310 n.19 (Del. 2015). 
123. Id. (quoting William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of 
Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1317–18 (2001)). 
124. MFW, 67 A.3d at 527. 
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stockholders and the Court of Chancery the tool of injunctive relief to address 
important M&A decisions in real time, before closing. They were not tools designed 
with post-closing money damages claims in mind.”125 Indeed, virtually all of the 
landmark merger cases under Revlon and Unocal involve a rival bidder as the plaintiff, 
not stockholders. Furthermore, these cases do not involve challenges to the merger 
price but rather to defensive measures intended to ward off a hostile bid or steer 
the target company into the arms of a favored acquirer.126 
Under this view, enhanced scrutiny is intended to provide the Court of 
Chancery with a tool to police self-serving actions by the target board that may tend 
to entrench them or otherwise hamper a robust auction dynamic. The implication 
of this argument is that even with post-closing damages foreclosed by business 
judgment rule deference, pre-closing challenges by rival bidders (or, presumably, 
stockholders) can adequately police managerial misconduct surrounding mergers. 
C. The Business Judgment Rule 
Another justification—perhaps the paramount one—for Corwin and MFW is 
that deference under such circumstances is in keeping with the underlying rationale 
for the business judgment rule. As Vice Chancellor Laster summarized Delaware’s 
approach to the business judgment rule, “a court applying Delaware law searches 
for an independent, disinterested, and sufficiently informed decision maker. If one 
exists, then the court defers to the decision that the qualified decision maker made. 
Only in the absence of a qualified decision maker will the court assume that role for 
itself.”127 
The Corwin court concluded that independent directors and stockholders 
constitute such qualified decision makers for the purposes of approving a merger. 
As a result, it argued that its reasons for deference were “tied to the core rationale 
of the business judgment rule, which is that judges are poorly positioned to evaluate 
the wisdom of business decisions and there is little utility to having them  
second-guess the determination of impartial decision-makers with more 
information (in the case of directors) or an actual economic stake in the outcome 
(in the case of informed, disinterested stockholders).”128  
 
125. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312. 
126. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 919 (Del. 2003) (challenge 
by thwarted bidder seeking to invalidate deal protections granted to rival bidder); Paramount 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 36 (Del. 1994) (challenge by hostile bidder seeking 
to invalidate deal protections granted to rival bidder); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 
A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1990) (challenge by hostile bidder seeking to enjoin efforts to steer target into 
alternative transaction); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178  
(Del. 1985) (challenge by rival bidder seeking to nullify deal protections granted to favored acquirer);  
Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (challenge by hostile bidder seeking 
to enjoin defensive self-tender). 
127. Laster, supra note 22, at 1443. 
128. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 313–14; see also MFW, 67 A.3d at 502 (“This conclusion is consistent 
with the central tradition of Delaware law, which defers to the informed decisions of impartial directors, 
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D. Independent Directors and Institutional Stockholders 
The argument that directors and stockholders could be treated as qualified 
decision-makers to whom deference should be accorded under the business 
judgment rule is arguably bolstered by changes in board composition and patterns 
of stockholding over the past several decades. As Professors Solomon and Thomas 
recently noted, “the rise of independent directors and institutional investors had 
provided Delaware courts with alternative monitoring mechanisms” and, as a result 
“the view changed that judges were necessary to police this market as the courts 
recognized other private mechanisms.”129  
The prevalence of independent directors is, indeed, far greater than it was at 
the time the initial Delaware merger cases were decided.130 In 1970, a clear majority 
of large-company directors were insiders, with only approximately 20% plausibly 
characterized as independent.131 By the 1980s, while inside directors were still not 
uncommon, they were typically outnumbered by independent directors.132 By the 
turn of the century, it was rare for a public company board to contain a majority of 
insiders, in part due to changes in NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements.133 
The trend ultimately became law as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act134 and Dodd-Frank 
Act135 mandated independent majorities on public company boards of directors, as 
well as audit committees consisting wholly of independent directors. A clear 
majority of S&P 500 firms now have only a single non-independent director, 
typically the company’s CEO.136 
In theory, the increasing dominance of independent directors could serve to 
mitigate what Unocal called the “omnipresent specter” that the board would yield to 
 
especially when those decisions have been approved by the disinterested stockholders on full 
information and without coercion.”). 
129. Solomon & Thomas, supra note 5, at 7–8. 
130. See Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board Independence, 92 N.C. L. REV. 855, 864 
(2014) (“The number of insiders sitting on corporate boards declined steadily from the mid-1970s and 
fell precipitously towards the end of the century.”). 
131. See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of  
Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 113 (1985). 
132. See Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Determinants of Board Composition, 
19 RAND J. ECON. 589 (1988); Velkonja, supra note 130, at 863 (“Most public companies have 
maintained a majority independent board since at least the late 1980s.”). 
133. See Ran Duchin, John G. Matsusaka & Oguzhan Ozbas, When Are Outside Directors 
Effective?, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 196 (2010). Writing in 2002, Professors Bhagat and Black could write 
that “[t]oday, almost all [boards] have a majority (usually a large majority) of outside directors, most 
have a majority (often a large majority) of independent directors, and an increasing number have only 
one or two inside directors.” Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 232 (2002). 
134. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
135. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
136. See Velikonja, supra note 130, at 864 (noting that in 1986, only 3% of S&P 500 firms had 
only one inside director, and that the figure had risen to 23% in 1997 and 60% in 2013). 
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conflicts of interest in the merger context.137 This is both because independent 
directors will typically have less of an interest in entrenchment and change-of-
control payments and because they will often be constrained by countervailing 
reputational interests.138  
The rise of independent directors has been mirrored by a rise in institutional 
investors. In 1950, the vast majority of public company shares were held by 
individuals, with only about 6% of U.S. equities held by institutional investors—
including mutual funds, pension funds, and other investment funds and financial 
institutions.139 By 1980, institutional ownership had crossed 25%140 and has now 
risen past 80% of the equity value of the S&P 500.141 A number of these institutional 
investors are so-called “activist funds” that seek to take an active role in shaping 
corporate policy.  
As far back as 1994, the Delaware Supreme Court suggested that the increasing 
prevalence of institutional investors created a potential check on managerial 
opportunism.142 In his MFW opinion, then-Chancellor Strine emphasized that 
“[m]arket developments in the score of years since have made it far easier, not 
harder, for stockholders to protect themselves,”143 pointing to increased 
institutional ownership144 and better availability of information.145 After noting the 
willingness of stockholders to buck management initiatives,146 the court concluded 
 
137. See Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); Solomon & 
Thomas, supra note 5, at 11 (noting that “boards were now comprised of a majority of independent 
directors who presumably were more willing to serve as a check against conflicted management 
responses”). 
138. See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 528–29 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“The Supreme Court 
has held that independent directors are presumed to be motivated to do their duty with fidelity, like 
most other people, and has also observed that directors have a more self-protective interest in retaining 
their reputations as faithful, diligent fiduciaries.”). The MFW court went on to emphasize that this 
reputational interest is especially strong “in a market where many independent directors serve on several 
boards, and where institutional investors and their voting advisors, such as ISS and Glass Lewis, have 
computer-aided memory banks available to remind them of the past record of directors . . . .” Id. at 529. 
139. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 874 (2013); Jeffrey  
N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value 
and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1568 (2007). 
140. Gordon, supra note 139, at 1568. 
141. See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2016) 
(“[I]nstitutional investors like BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity, and State Street now own around 80% of 
all stock in S&P 500 corporations.”). 
142. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1382 (Del. 1995) (“Institutions are more 
likely than other shareholders to vote at all [and] more likely to vote against manager proposals.”). 
143. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 530 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
144. Id. (noting that “institutional investor holdings have only grown since 1994, making it 
easier for a blocking position of minority investors to be assembled”). 
145. Id. (“With the development of the internet, there is more public information than ever 
about various commentators’, analysts’, institutional investors’, journalists’ and others’ views about the 
wisdom of transactions.”). 
146. Id. at 531 (“Stockholders have mounted more proxy fights, and, as important, wielded the 
threat of a proxy fight or a ‘withhold vote’ campaign to secure changes in both corporate policies and 
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that “[g]iven the evident and growing power of modern stockholders, there seems 
to be little basis to doubt the fairness-assuring effectiveness of an upfront  
majority-of-the-minority vote condition.”147 While the Corwin court did not 
mention these considerations, the same logic would necessarily apply to a 
stockholder vote in an uncontrolled company.148 
E. Positive Incentive Effects 
Central to the holding in MFW was the desire to give controllers “a strong 
incentive for the wide employment of a transactional structure highly beneficial to 
minority investors.”149 Under Lynch, a controlling stockholder could shift the 
burden of proof on fairness by employing either an independent committee or a 
majority-of-the-minority condition, but would receive no additional benefit from 
employing both protections. As a result, the controlling stockholder had no 
incentive to employ what most agreed was the optimal transactional structure for 
freezeouts.150 By granting controlling stockholders the protections of the business 
judgment rule in the presence of both safeguards, MFW provides a powerful 
incentive to mimic the protections of an arm’s-length deal.151 
F. Stockholder Vote as Ratification 
Another intuitive defense of both MFW and Corwin is that both decisions are, 
in broad strokes, consistent with general principles of stockholder ratification. Both 
by statute and under the common law, an informed vote of the stockholders can 
ratify—and thereby insulate from judicial review—even overtly self-dealing 
transactions.152 On its face, or so the logic of Corwin suggests, a decision to accept 
 
the composition of corporate boards. Stockholders have voted against mergers they did not find 
favorable, or forced increases in price.”) (internal citations omitted). 
147. Id. at 532. 
148. See Solomon & Thomas, supra note 17, at 11 (“Hedge funds, empowered and backed by 
institutional shareholders, could police misconduct and oppose, support or even instigate, takeovers.”). 
149. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 536 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
150. See id. at 501 (“For controlling stockholders who knew that they would get a burden shift 
if they did one of the procedural protections, but who did not know if they would get any additional 
benefit for taking the certain business risk of assenting to an additional and potent procedural 
protection for the minority stockholders, the incentive to use both procedural devices and thus replicate 
the key elements of the arm’s-length merger process was therefore minimal to downright 
discouraging.”); see also Subramanian, supra note 16, at 16–17 (“With the burden thus shifted through a 
well-functioning [special committee], controllers have no further incentive to provide a [majority-of-
the-minority] condition.”). 
151. MFW, 67 A.3d at 535 (“Importantly, this incentive structure can be made even more 
effective as an efficient and powerful way of ensuring fair treatment of the minority in going private 
transactions.”); id. at 502-03 (“[T]he adoption of this rule will be of benefit to minority stockholders 
because it will provide a strong incentive for controlling stockholders to accord minority investors the 
transactional structure that respected scholars believe will provide them the best protection . . . .”) 
(citing Gilson & Gordon, supra note 16, at 839–40; Subramanian, supra note 16, at 60–61).  
152. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2019); In re Wheelabrator Inc., S’holders Litig., 
663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
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or reject a merger is no different, and a vote of approval should have a similar 
ratifying effect.153  
Indeed, as discussed more fully below, a large proportion of cases cited by the 
Corwin court in support of its core holding are concerned more with stockholder 
approval in general—of asset sales, charter amendments, executive compensation 
packages, etc.—than with the specific question of stockholder approval of a merger. 
The court noted that some of the cases involved full, formal ratification under 
Delaware law, while others involved “ratification” in the more colloquial sense of 
an approval that warrants a reduction in judicial scrutiny.154 The authority the Corwin 
court sought to rely on, however, was “the critical reasoning of these  
opinions . . . giving standard of review-invoking effect to a fully informed vote of 
the disinterested stockholders.”155  
G. Availability of Appraisal 
Allowing stockholders to seek post-closing monetary damages in a merger 
class action may also seem redundant, given the availability of the appraisal 
remedy.156 The appraisal remedy already allows a dissenting stockholder to refuse 
the merger consideration and instead file a special judicial proceeding where the 
sole remedy available is the “fair value” of the dissenter’s shares.157 Given that fair 
value is generally the remedy sought in a post-closing fiduciary duty class action, it 
would arguably be more efficient to simply relegate all dissatisfied stockholders to 
appraisal. Appraisal is already typically the exclusive remedy available for short-form 
mergers, and Professor Myers and I have argued elsewhere that the merger class 
action might profitably be eliminated in favor of a strengthened appraisal-like 
remedy.158  
In his opinion in MFW, and in several related opinions, then-Chancellor Strine 
repeatedly references the continuing availability of appraisal as a judicial backstop 
even where a fiduciary duty class action cannot go forward.159 While the Supreme 
 
153. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313 (Del. 2015) (“When the real 
parties in interest—the disinterested equity owners—can easily protect themselves at the ballot box by 
simply voting no, the utility of a litigation-intrusive standard of review promises more costs to 
stockholders in the form of litigation rents and inhibitions on risk-taking than it promises in terms of 
benefits to them.”). 
154. Id. at 310 n.19 (“In citing to these authorities, we note than many of them used the term 
‘ratification’ in a looser sense than the clarified and narrow description that was given to that term in 
the scholarly Gantler opinion.”). 
155. Id. 
156. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2019). 
157. For a description of the appraisal remedy and its modern usage, see Charles R. Korsmo & 
Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551 
(2015). 
158. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 25; see also Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The 
Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829 (2014) (arguing 
that litigation agency costs play a less pernicious role in appraisal litigation than in merger class actions). 
159. See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 503 (Del. Ch. 2013) (arguing that merger 
litigation “promises more cost than benefit” and that this “is especially the case because stockholders 
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Court’s Corwin opinion makes no reference to appraisal—it may be that Chief 
Justice Strine has cooled somewhat on appraisal in the intervening years—the need 
for post-closing damages actions for arm’s-length mergers is also attenuated if a 
robust appraisal remedy is available. Indeed, some respected academic 
commentators suggest that increased appraisal activity in recent years may be driven, 
in part, by a migration of claims that once would have been filed as class actions.160 
H. No Value from Merger Litigation 
Perhaps the most ubiquitous justification for not allowing post-closing 
damages actions to proceed is that such litigation provides no value in the first 
place—or, at the very least, not enough value to justify the associated costs. The 
evidence on this score was presented above, and the picture of merger litigation as 
a sewer of nuisance litigation is evident in the case law.161 In MFW, for example, 
the chancery court acknowledged that “[t]he loss from invoking the business 
judgment rule standard of review is whatever residual value it provides to minority 
investors to have the potential for judicial review of fairness.”162 Before 
summarizing the unwholesome dynamics of merger litigation, however, the court 
notes that “[t]he difficulty for the plaintiffs is that what evidence exists suggests that 
the systemic benefits of the possibility of such review in cases like this are slim to 
non-existent.”163 
While the Corwin court denied that its decision represented a change in course, 
it is difficult to understand the developments of the past decade without an 
appreciation of the increasingly apparent failure of merger litigation. In describing 
what they characterize as an overall scaling back of judicial scrutiny in the merger 
context, Professors Davidoff and Thomas emphasize the mounting evidence that 
 
who vote no, and do not wish to accept the merger consideration in a going private transaction despite 
the other stockholders’ decision to support the merger, will typically have the right to seek appraisal”); 
id. at 535 (“[A]ny minority stockholder who voted no on a going private merger where appraisal is 
available, which is frequently the case, may also exercise her appraisal rights. Although appraisal is not 
a cost-free remedy, institutional ownership concentration has made it an increasingly effective one, and 
there are obvious examples of where it has been used effectively.”); see also In re Lear Corp. S’holders 
Litig., 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. 2007) (noting that stockholders who think the merger consideration is 
insufficient “may vote no and seek appraisal”); In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 
1023 (Del. Ch. 2005) (same). 
160. See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 17 (suggesting that “substantive cutbacks” in fiduciary duty 
law “may help explain a related development, the rapid increase in Delaware appraisal litigation”). 
161. Sometimes the analogy to a sewer borders on explicit. In his remarks at Tulane in 2017, 
Chief Justice Strine referred to the dynamics of merger litigation as “just skanky” and then, warming to 
his theme, clarified that he did not mean “Bourbon Street when you’re having fun. It’s Bourbon Street 
the next morning when the last thing you need to do is to smell something bad that just puts you over 
the line that holds it together.” Gay Jervey et al, Strine Moments, 17 M&A J. 1, 3 (June 2017).  
162. MFW, 67 A.3d at 534. 
163. Id.; see also In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 606 (Del. Ch. 2005) 
(arguing that private litigation driven by plaintiffs’ lawyers did not function effectively). 
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merger litigation was not functioning properly.164 They also point to the almost 
complete absence of injunctions or (especially) monetary payments to stockholders 
as evidence that merger litigation had come to serve little purpose except as a vehicle 
for legal fees and releases of liability.165 For any who would argue that something is 
being lost by blocking the possibility of post-closing damages, the ready response is 
to ask, “How can you miss something you never had?”  
IV. MFW AND CORWIN REPRESENT AN UNWARRANTED WEAKENING OF 
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF MERGERS 
In the last Section, I introduced the main justifications for the results of MFW 
and Corwin. No doubt others are possible, but the arguments listed convey the main 
themes, and I have attempted to give them full and fair expression. Thus far, I have 
withheld critical evaluation of the arguments, which is provided in this section. In 
short, I find that most, if not all, of the arguments are substantially weaker than they 
first appear.  
A. Prior Precedent is Unclear at Best 
MFW admittedly addressed a question of first impression, and thus 
unavoidably created new law. The claim that Corwin was nothing new, however, is 
a little harder to credit. Certainly after MFW held that a controller freeze-out would 
receive business judgment rule deference if it mimicked the conditions of an  
arm’s-length deal, it only stood to reason that an actual arm’s-length deal should 
also receive the same deference. But it is far from clear that this has always been the 
universal understanding. Instead, MFW may have stolen a march by awarding the 
business judgment rule rather than enhanced scrutiny.  
In part, the uncertainty in the case law is due to the scarcity of merger cases 
proceeding all the way to a full written opinion. But case law prior to Corwin was, at 
best, mixed. Indeed, just months prior to the Corwin decision, Vice Chancellor 
Parsons was confronted with the same question as in Corwin and held that “where, 
as here, the merger consideration paid to the target company’s stockholders is cash, 
Revlon enhanced scrutiny applies, even after the merger has been approved by a fully 
informed, disinterested majority of stockholders.”166 Even if Corwin was not the 
 
164. See Solomon & Thomas, supra note 17, at 11 (“[B]y 2010 the costs of such regulation [by 
litigation] were proving to be excessive due to widespread and admittedly frivolous litigation”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
165. Id. at 12 (pointing to “the small number of cases which result in a significant monetary 
payment to shareholders or an injunction enjoining the deal from completion”). 
166. In re Zale Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 9388–VCP, 2015 WL 5853693, at *10  
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2015); see also id. (“Until the Supreme Court signals otherwise, I interpret [prior 
precedent] as holding that an enhanced standard of review cannot be pared down to the business 
judgment rule as a result of a statutorily required stockholder vote, even one rendered by a fully 
informed, disinterested majority of stockholders.”). After Corwin, Vice Chancellor Parsons granted  
re-argument on the issue and dismissed all claims. See In re Zale Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 9388–VCP, 
2015 WL 6551418 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2015). 
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bolt from the blue it is sometimes portrayed as, the fact that a Vice Chancellor 
directly contradicted its holding mere months earlier suggests it was hardly an 
uncontroversial application of uniform precedent. 
The Corwin opinion at least partially masks this uncertainty in two ways. First, 
it repeatedly cites as authority cases on stockholder approval of director actions that 
have little or nothing to do with mergers, assuming a fortiori that the same 
considerations apply equally in the merger context. As noted above, footnote 19 of 
the Corwin opinion cites sixteen cases as “additional precedent under Delaware law 
the proposition that the approval of the disinterested stockholders in a fully 
informed, uncoerced vote that was required to consummate a transaction has the 
effect of invoking the business judgment rule.” Of these sixteen, ten do not involve 
mergers at all, but are instead cases involving approval of spin-offs of subsidiaries, 
asset sales, charter amendments, or incentive compensation plans.167 In most of 
these ten cases, enhanced scrutiny under Revlon or Unocal is never even a possibility 
that is discussed, and in none of them is Revlon or Unocal held to apply.  
Two of the remaining six cases are from the 1920s and 1930s and involved 
challenges by preferred stockholders, with respect to whom fiduciary duties apply 
somewhat differently.168 One involved a challenge to an asset sale where it is far 
from clear Revlon would apply under modern law.169 The other, MacFarlane, 
challenged a stock-for-stock consolidation—where, again, Revlon would likely not 
apply—and involved a dispute over the division of the merger proceeds between 
the common and preferred stockholders, rather than the overall adequacy of the 
consideration.170 In MacFarlane, the issue of ratification was rather theoretical, given 
that fewer than half the preferred shares had been voted in favor of the 
consolidation in any case, and most of these were voted by stockholders who also 
had substantial crossholdings of common stock.171 None of these twelve cases 
 
167. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992) (involving charter amendments that the court 
found not to implicate Unocal); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987) (involving Sec. 144 
ratification of self-interested loans); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979) (involving 
stockholder approval of a stock option plan); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57 (Del. 1952) 
(involving approval of a stock option plan); Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 2007) (involving 
a charter amendment and incentive compensation plan); Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098  
(Del. Ch. 1999) (involving the spinoff and recapitalization of a subsidiary of General Motors); In re 
General Motors Class H S’holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611 (Del. Ch. 1999) (same); Apple Comput.,  
Inc. v. Exponential Tech., Inc., No. 16315, 1999 WL 39547 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21 1999) (involving a 
challenge to an asset sale conducted without a statutorily required stockholder vote which was found 
to have been remedied by subsequent submission to the stockholders for ratification); Weiss  
v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., No. 8811, 1989 WL 80345 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1989) (involving a charter 
amendment); Schiff v. RKO Pictures Corp., 104 A.2d 267 (Del. Ch. 1954) (involving a sale of assets to 
the CEO). 
168. See generally Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78  
BROOK. L. REV. 1163 (2013). 
169. Cole v. Nat’l Cash Credit Ass’n, 156 A. 183 (Del. Ch. 1931). 
170. MacFarlane v. N. Am. Cement Corp., 157 A. 396 (Del. Ch. 1928). 
171. See id. at 399 (noting that the vote in favor of merger was “of little evidentiary value”). 
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speaks clearly to the effect a stockholder vote should have in the special 
circumstances of a change of control transaction. 
Three of the remaining four cases cited were opinions written by Strine while 
on the Court of Chancery. In all three, any analogy to the facts of Corwin would 
have been dicta. For two of the three, any analogy would also be strained, as they 
involved squeeze-outs, where Strine found that entire fairness applied, rather than 
enhanced scrutiny.172 One of these two involved a challenge to the acquirer’s board 
for paying too much, rather than the target’s for accepting too little.173 The third 
case, Morton’s, is unquestionably analogous, involving a stockholder vote approving 
an arm’s-length merger to which Revlon applied.174 On the question at issue in 
Corwin, however, any statement in Morton’s is emphatically dicta, given that the 
defendants never raised the argument that the stockholder vote altered the standard 
of review.175 The fact that counsel for defendants—experienced litigators from top 
firms like Young Conaway; Potter Anderson; Morgan, Lewis & Bockius; Connolly 
Gallagher and Jones Day176—did not even make this apparently case-winning 
argument in a 2013 case perhaps undermines Morton’s as support for the notion 
that Corwin is nothing new. 
Only one of the sixteen cases—In re Lukens177—involved a stockholder vote 
in a merger where enhanced scrutiny under Revlon would apply, and was not dicta. 
As such, it does support the holding of Corwin.178 The Lukens opinion was notably 
cautious, however, admitting that “the matter is hardly free from doubt.”179 
Furthermore, Vice Chancellor Lamb limited his holding in Lukens to cases “where 
there was an active bidding process, no measures precluded any participant from 
bidding, and the merger agreement presented to stockholders represented the 
highest offer made by anyone.”180 On its face, and as applied, Corwin blocks judicial 
scrutiny under a far broader set of circumstances. 
Elsewhere in the opinion, two additional cases are cited in support of the 
central holding.181 The first is another opinion from then-Vice Chancellor Strine 
 
172. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 763 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(“This is the post-trial decision in an entire fairness case.”); In re PNB Holding Co., No. Civ. A 28-N, 
2006 WL 2403999 at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (finding “that the Merger is presumptively subject to 
entire fairness review”). 
173. In re S. Peru Copper, 52 A.3d 761. 
174. In re Morton’s Rest. Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
175. Id. at 663 n.34 (suggesting that stockholder approval would invoke the business judgment 
rule, but acknowledging that “[t]he defendants here, however, have not made this particular argument”). 
176. Id. at 657. 
177. In re Lukens, 757 A.2d 720 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
178. While Lukens was a Chancery Court opinion, it was affirmed without opinion “on the 
basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Court of Chancery in its well-reasoned opinion.” Walker  
v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d at 1278 (Del. 2000). 
179. In re Lukens, 757 A.2d at 736. 
180. Id. at 737. 
181. The same two cases—along with several of the sixteen just discussed—are cited for 
support in the Court of Chancery’s MFW opinion. See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 527 
(Del. Ch. 2013). 
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dealing with the very different question of approval of a merger by the acquiring 
firm’s stockholders.182 As such, it is of limited support for the holding in Corwin. 
The second, however, is the celebrated Wheelabrator case, which famously outlines 
the different effects stockholder approval can have under Delaware law.183 
Wheelabrator involves a situation roughly analogous to that at issue in Corwin, and is 
undoubtedly the best-known case prior to Corwin to address the issue. Together, 
Wheelabrator and Lukens are the clearest precedents for the holding in Corwin.  
The Corwin court did address, directly and convincingly, the recent, 
superficially conflicting precedent of Gantler v. Stephens.184 In Gantler, Justice Jacobs 
attempted to clean up decades of loose usage of the term “ratification,” which could 
be traced back to language from the Van Gorkom opinion. As he had in his 
Wheelabrator opinion, Justice Jacobs sought to distinguish between 1) “‘classic’ or 
paradigmatic” ratification, which “describes the situation where shareholders 
approve board action that, legally speaking, could be accomplished without any 
shareholder approval,” and 2) “the effect of an informed shareholder vote that was 
statutorily required for the transaction to have legal existence.”185 Justice Jacobs 
clarified that only the first situation actually constituted ratification.186 This, of 
course, would exclude a stockholder vote approving a merger, which is statutorily 
required in order for the transaction to have legal existence. 
The plaintiffs in Corwin argued that Gantler’s holding meant that a stockholder 
vote on a merger can have no ratifying effect. The court sensibly rejected this 
argument, concluding that Gantler was focused on clarifying the “precise term 
‘ratification’” and was not intended to imply that a statutorily required stockholder 
vote could have no effect on the appropriate standard of review.187 This is the most 
plausible reading of Gantler, given that the plaintiffs’ reading would mean the court 
had, without expressing any such intention, overruled the substantive holding of 
Wheelabrator—an opinion also written by Jacobs and quoted approvingly 
throughout the Gantler opinion.188 Any such holding would also have been dicta, 
given that the court found that the stockholder vote at issue was not fully informed 
because the relevant disclosures were defective.189 
 
182. Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
183. See In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
184. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
185. Id. at 713 (quoting In re Wheelabrator, 663 A.2d 1194, 1202 n.4). 
186. Id. (“To restore coherence and clarity to this area of our law, we hold that the scope of the 
shareholder ratification doctrine must be limited to its so-called ‘classic’ form; that is, to circumstances 
where a fully informed shareholder vote approves director action that does not legally require 
shareholder approval in order to become legally effective.”). 
187. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 311 (Del. 2015). 
188. Id. at 310. 
189. Id. (endorsing the trial court’s holding that “any statement about the effect a statutorily 
required vote had on the appropriate standard of review would have been dictum because in Gantler 
the Court held that the disclosures regarding the vote in question . . . were materially misleading”). For 
a more thorough argument in favor of the Corwin court’s reading of Gantler, see Laster, supra note 22, 
at 1477–83. 
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Unlike Gantler, however, a number of conflicting precedents exist that are 
either glossed over or ignored entirely by the Corwin court. The most prominent of 
these is the Delaware Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in Santa Fe, which arguably 
should have controlled.190 The case involved a battle to acquire Santa Fe Industries, 
where Santa Fe’s board allegedly took a number of defensive actions to protect a 
deal with a friendly acquirer and ward off a competing hostile bidder.191 While the 
hostile bidder initially sought a preliminary injunction, after several unfavorable 
rulings it withdrew its bid, leaving the stockholders as the remaining plaintiffs, and 
they persisted in their claims post-closing, after a stockholder vote approving the 
merger with the favored bidder.192  
The defendants argued that the informed stockholder vote extinguished any 
claims under Revlon and Unocal.193 Though the court agreed that the vote had been 
an informed one, the court rejected the ratification argument, holding that 
“[p]ermitting the vote of a majority of stockholders on a merger to remove from 
judicial scrutiny unilateral Board action in a contest for corporate control would 
frustrate the purposes underlying Revlon and Unocal.”194 The court explained its 
reasoning as follows: 
In voting to approve the [merger], the Santa Fe stockholders were not 
asked to ratify the Board’s unilateral decision to erect defensive measures 
against the [competing] offer. The stockholders were merely offered a 
choice between the [Board’s favored] Merger and doing nothing. The Santa 
Fe stockholders did not vote in favor of the precise measures under 
challenge in the complaint . . . . Since the stockholders of Santa Fe merely 
voted in favor of the merger and not the defensive measures, we decline 
to find ratification in this instance.195 
The court went on to find that enhanced scrutiny was the proper standard for 
reviewing the Santa Fe board’s actions, requiring the defendants “to justify their 
decisionmaking within a range of reasonableness.”196 
The holding of Santa Fe was on similar facts as Corwin—an arm’s-length 
merger approved by an informed vote of the stockholders. It answered the same 
question—the effect of the stockholder vote on the standard of review. It was 
decided by the Delaware Supreme Court rather than a trial court. Furthermore, the 
holding was not dicta. This combination of attributes makes it unique among the 
cases mentioned in Corwin. The court did not, however, analyze Santa Fe. Instead, 
it noted that “the parties have engaged in an interesting debate” about it, but 
declared that it was “unnecessary to engage in that debate, when the overwhelming 
 
190. In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. S’holders Litig., 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995). 
191. Id. at 63–65. 
192. Id. at 65. 
193. Id. at 67. 
194. Id. at 68. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 72. 
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weight of our state’s case law supports the Chancellor’s decision below.”197 The 
court also noted that “a learned article [by Vice Chancellor Laster] has a thoughtful 
consideration of [Santa Fe].”198 In light of this statement, it is worth quoting that 
article’s conclusion that “the case [Santa Fe] stands as an apparent impediment to 
the view that a fully informed stockholder vote on a merger otherwise subject to 
enhanced scrutiny causes the transaction to be reviewed under the business 
judgment rule.”199 
In addition, the Corwin court did not cite any of a number of Chancery Court 
opinions applying enhanced scrutiny to post-closing damages claims, even in the 
presence of a stockholder vote that was conceded or found to be informed.200 Nor 
did the court take notice of the large settlements reached in recent cases like El Paso 
or Del Monte, involving post-closing merger class actions following informed 
stockholder votes.201 Following Corwin, it appears unlikely these cases could survive 
a motion to dismiss, let alone result in settlements far beyond the costs of litigation.  
Perhaps most revealing, however, was the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
approach in the well-known Lyondell case.202 In the opinion being appealed, Vice 
Chancellor Noble had applied enhanced scrutiny under Revlon in denying a motion 
to dismiss claims that the defendants had not taken appropriate steps to secure the 
best price reasonably available.203 Enhanced scrutiny was applied—and found to 
preclude dismissal—despite the overwhelming stockholder vote in favor of the 
merger, and despite the defendant’s argument that the vote constituted a 
ratification.204  
In his opinion, Noble found that the ratification defense had been raised too 
late in the proceedings for the plaintiffs to respond adequately, but nonetheless 
engaged in a lengthy digression on the issue.205 After acknowledging fellow Vice 
Chancellor Strine’s dicta in Solomon that “an informed and uncoerced shareholder 
vote on the [merger] provides an independent reason to maintain business judgment 
 
197. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, n.20 (Del. 2015). 
198. Id. 
199. Laster, supra note 22, at 1477. 
200. See, e.g., In re Zale Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 9388–VCP, 2015 WL 5853693, at *10  
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2015) (“Until the Supreme Court signals otherwise, I interpret Gantler as holding that 
an enhanced standard of review cannot be pared down to the business judgment rule as a result of a 
statutorily required stockholder vote, even one rendered by a fully informed, disinterested majority of 
stockholders.”); In re Novell, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6032–VCN, 2014 WL 6686785  
(Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2014) (applying enhanced scrutiny to arm’s-length merger despite overwhelming, 
informed stockholder approval); Rand v. W. Air Lines, Inc., No. 8632, 1994 WL 89006  
(Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1994) (“Such a claim requires the Court to apply enhanced scrutiny.”). 
201. See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432 (Del. Ch. 2012) ($110 million 
settlement); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., No. 6027–VCL (Del. Ch. June 7, 2011) ($89.4 
million settlement). 
202. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). 
203. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., No. 3176–VCN, 2008 WL 2923437, at *12 (Del. Ch. July  
29, 2008). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at n.129. 
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protection for the board’s acts,”206 Noble concluded that the reasoning of Santa Fe 
was more persuasive. Just as the Supreme Court had found that Santa Fe’s 
stockholders “could not have approved the board’s unilateral decision to erect 
defensive barriers” by voting for the merger, Lyondell’s stockholders “could not 
have been asked to ratify the Board’s alleged unilateral decision to abdicate its 
fundamental fiduciary obligations in that regard simply by voting in favor of  
the Merger.”207 
Vice Chancellor Noble’s opinion was reversed on appeal. Interestingly, 
however, the Delaware Supreme Court did not address the standard of review issue 
at all, which would have furnished easy grounds for reversal. Instead, the court 
conducted a delicate analysis of when exactly Revlon duties attach and what they 
require from a target board. It may be that the Delaware Supreme Court agreed that 
the defendants had waived the argument, but the court’s failure even to mention 
the issue—and resolve an evident confusion—suggests that the issue was not 
entirely cut and dried. 
Given the foregoing, it is difficult to conclude that Corwin was simply an 
application of a deep strain of uncontroversial precedent. The picture of precedent 
presented in the opinion is only partial. At best, Corwin presents a case of selective 
and dubious citation. At worst, it represents the bootstrapping of prior Chancery 
Court dicta into binding precedent. Of course, it is tempting to say that it does not 
matter whether Corwin is really “new” or not. Whether it is good or bad depends 
little on its novelty.208 Nonetheless, the burden of persuasion often rests, and 
sensibly so, on the party seeking a change in the status quo. 
B. Pre-Closing Claims Are Insufficient to Police Merger-Related Misconduct 
The argument that Revlon and Unocal were never intended to provide enhanced 
scrutiny to post-closing money damages actions involves several claims. The first is 
historical, and was evaluated in the last sub-Section, with inconclusive results. The 
second is that pre-closing preliminary injunction suits are sufficient for policing the 
“omnipresent specter” of conflicts of interest in merger transactions. And arguably 
third, that injunctive suits by competing bidders are likely to be effective in policing 
misconduct.209 Regardless of what enhanced scrutiny under Revlon and Unocal was 
“designed” to do, if having it at the preliminary injunction stage is sufficient, there 
would be little need for it post-closing. Conversely, if pre-closing enhanced scrutiny 
 
206. Id. (quoting Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1117 (Del. Ch. 1999)). 
207. Id. 
208. As then-Chancellor Strine noted in his MFW opinion, “tradition should admittedly not 
persist if it lacks current value.” In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 527 (Del. Ch. 2013) (citing 
Keeler v. Hartford Mut. Ins. Co., 672 A.2d 1012, 1017 n.6 (Del. 1996)) (a rule should not be followed 
if its best defense is that it was “laid down in the time of Henry IV”) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)). 
209. As noted above, many, if not most, of the landmark merger cases have involved a rival 
bidder as plaintiff. See cases cited, supra note 126. 
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is unlikely to be effective in policing serious conflicts, it may be appropriate to retain 
it in post-closing damages actions. 
In addressing these contentions, it is helpful to recall the kinds of conflicts 
that can plague merger-related decisions. As then-Chancellor Strine noted in his 
opinion in El Paso: 
[A]s Revlon itself made clear, the potential sale of a corporation has 
enormous implications for corporate managers and advisors, and a range 
of human motivations, including but by no means limited to greed, can 
inspire fiduciaries and their advisors to be less than faithful to their 
contextual duty to pursue the best value for the company’s stockholders.210  
Put simply, merger decisions are different from other types of decisions—
even important decisions—boards make while running a firm as a going concern. 
The potential conflicts fall under three broad headings in the context of an  
arm’s-length merger.211 
First is the concern that managers212 will seek to entrench themselves. The 
conflict is fairly obvious. Managers want to keep their jobs and the accompanying 
perquisites. In the event of a takeover, however, the new owners would boot them 
out of office. As a result, they may be willing to spurn an offer that would be 
beneficial to the stockholders. This was a dominant concern in the 1980s merger 
cases, including Unocal and Revlon, at a time of heated debate over the rise of 
leveraged buyouts, hostile takeovers, and the market for corporate control.213 The 
conflict can result in defensive measures, such as poison pills, designed to ward off 
a takeover altogether,214 or favoritism and deal protections intended to steer the 
firm into the arms of a favored bidder who will not replace management.215 In the 
former, the harm to stockholders comes from losing out on an attractive deal. In 
 
210. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
211. Additional conflicts of a fairly obvious nature come into play in non-arm’s-length mergers 
(i.e., management buyouts or controlling stockholder squeeze-outs). It is worth noting, however, that 
even an ostensibly arm’s length merger can end up infected by the kinds of dynamics normally 
associated with conflicted mergers. In El Paso, for example, El Paso’s lead financial adviser, Goldman 
Sachs, owned a 19% stake in the acquirer, Kinder Morgan, giving it a large incentive to get the lowest 
price possible. In re El Paso, 41 A.3d at 434. Meanwhile, the bankers brought in to cleanse this conflict, 
Morgan Stanley, only got paid in event the merger with Kinder Morgan was consummated, receiving 
nothing if another option were pursued. Id. at 442. 
212. Rather than repeatedly employing the cumbersome locution “officers and directors,” I will 
refer to both together as “managers” in this section. While it is obviously the directors who are the 
ultimate decision-makers in the merger context, as a practical matter the officers will also generally play 
a large, perhaps dominant role. 
213. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1180–81 (1981) (describing the 
market for corporate control and the risk of entrenchment and arguing that most defensive measures 
should be proscribed). 
214. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (involving 
Unocal management’s efforts to ward off a hostile tender offer from Mesa Petroleum). 
215. See, e.g., Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184  
(Del. 1985) (involving Revlon management’s efforts to steer itself to a favored acquirer while warding 
off a hostile bidder). 
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the latter, the harm comes from management leaving stockholder money on the 
table in exchange for job security. 
Second is the broader concern that management will seek to divert value from 
the stockholders to themselves.216 This siphoning off of value can be done in 
innumerable ways, ranging from employment agreements,217 to change-in-control 
payments,218 to sweetheart side-deals,219 to straight-out cash bribes.220 The concern 
that management will try to steal from stockholders is, however, hardly unique to 
the merger context. Management always has an incentive to siphon value away from 
the firm and the stockholders and into their own pockets. 
What changes in the merger context is not the motive—or not exclusively the 
motive—but the opportunity. As many commentators have pointed out, while most 
managerial decisions take place in the context of on ongoing series of repeat 
transactions, the decision to approve a merger is, in game theoretic terms, a “final 
period” transaction.221 The business may continue after a merger, but as far as the 
relationship between managers and stockholders goes, a merger is the end of the 
road. For most decisions, managerial discretion is heavily constrained by a large 
number of legal and extra-legal constraints, including annual director elections, 
regular reports under securities law, product markets, capital markets, and labor 
markets, among others.222 Managers who behave foolishly or dishonestly in one 
period face the possibility of being found out, punished, or shamed in the next. 
Such constraints do not operate in the context of a final period transaction like a 
merger. In this respect, mergers are unlike partial asset sales, incentive compensation 
 
216. In a sense, entrenchment is simply a subset of this broader concern—management trading 
off value for the stockholders for the value of their own jobs. The entrenchment concern is sufficiently 
important, however, to merit emphasis in its own right. 
217. See Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963 (Del. Ch. 2000) (declining to 
dismiss a duty of loyalty claim involving a CEO who negotiated a lucrative employment agreement in 
connection with a merger transaction). 
218. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 687 (Del. Ch. 2014) (declining to grant 
summary judgment on a claim that officers of a target company favored a bidder who “was willing to 
confirm that it would honor management’s change in control agreements and monetize all equity 
awards”). 
219. See In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434 (Del. Ch. 2012) (noting that the 
target company’s CEO was simultaneously planning to personally buy back part of the company from 
the acquirer, giving him an incentive to reach a lower price). 
220. See, e.g., Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (manager “allegedly 
demanded that any potential acquirer pay [him] for his approval of the merger”). 
221. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon Land, 81 FORDHAM  
L. REV. 3277, 3291 (2013) (“[S]tructural decisions—such as corporate takeovers—present a final period 
problem entailing an especially severe conflict of interest.”); Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions 
in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1945 (2003) (“Another corporate law last period 
problem occurs when a company is sold . . . .”). 
222. See Bainbridge, supra note 221, at 3292 (“[S]hareholder voting is just one of an array of 
extrajudicial constraints that, in totality, incentivize directors to exercise reasonable care in decision 
making. In particular, directors and managers are subject to important constraints imposed by the 
product and job markets.”); Griffith, supra note 221, at 1937–41 (discussing various legal and extra-legal 
constraints on managerial decision making). 
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plans, purchase of another company, or even charter amendments—the subjects of 
most of the cases cited by the Corwin case as supposedly analogous instances of 
stockholder ratification. 
Another aspect of the final period problem is that the division of value 
becomes a zero-sum game. In the ordinary course, barring completely perverse 
compensation schemes, management prospers in some rough correlation to the 
extent stockholders prosper. Management thus has an incentive to increase the size 
of the pie today, in order to increase their take tomorrow. In a merger however, 
once the amount of the merger consideration is fixed, the size of the pie is fixed 
and there is no tomorrow. All that matters is the amount managers can take for 
themselves now. 
In short, in a merger, because it is a final period decision, many of the former 
constraints on managerial opportunism fall away. As Professor Griffith puts it: 
Because it simultaneously releases managers and directors from their 
ordinary mid-stream constraints and increases the temptation to enrich 
oneself at the expense of a dying corporation and its anonymous 
shareholders, the last period signals a structural dilemma in corporate law, 
a point at which managers and directors have greater incentives to favor 
selfish objectives rather than the best interests of their shareholders. In the 
context of a negotiated acquisition, the target corporation’s board and 
management may demand side payments from the acquirer, thus 
effectively diverting a portion of the merger consideration from the 
shareholders to the management team.223 
The only constraints on value-hoarding that remain are 1) the short-term need 
to get stockholder approval; 2) the prospect of judicial sanction; and 3) reputational 
interests.224 Even reputational concerns may be attenuated, however, if the 
managers are near retirement or receiving a large enough cash-out to become 
indifferent to censure.225 
The third type of conflict is that managers, with their concentrated 
investments of human and financial capital in the firm, will be more sensitive to 
firm-specific risk than will diversified public stockholders. As a result, managers 
will be risk-averse, and will rationally apply a higher discount rate to the future cash 
flows of the firm than would an equally informed public stockholder. As a result, 
they may be willing to sell their shares for less than a public stockholder would.226 
 
223. Griffith, supra note 221, at 1947. 
224. To be charitable, perhaps we could add to this list the managers’ internal moral compasses. 
225. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, 
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1662 (2001) (noting that “if one can get 
seriously rich, one can move to Aspen and ski for the rest of one’s days”). 
226. Modern finance theory divides the risks faced by a firm into two broad categories: market 
risk and firm-specific risk. (An investor can effectively eliminate their exposure to firm-specific risk by 
holding a diversified portfolio. An undiversified stockholder, however, will bear both kinds of risks. 
Because the undiversified stockholder receives the same expected cash flows but bears greater risk, 
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This conflict is less frequently recognized but increasingly pervasive. Since the tax 
reform of the early 1990s, an increasing percentage of managerial compensation is 
in the form of stock options and stock grants, and many managers (including 
directors) have a substantial portion of their personal wealth invested in the firms 
they manage. The resulting conflict is especially acute when managers face restraints 
on their ability to sell, such as long vesting periods, which would be obviated in the 
event of a merger that triggers immediate vesting. Faced with a choice between a 
certain payout of a life-changing amount of money now on the one hand, or an 
uncertain payout in the future on the other, managers may opt for the former even 
where the latter has a higher expected value. 
Delaware case law has previously acknowledged precisely this sort of problem. 
For example, then-Vice Chancellor Strine held in In re Lear that a CEO’s exposure 
to non-diversifiable risk at a time when he was worried about retirement generated 
a potential conflict. The then-Vice Chancellor observed that it was “silly” to ignore 
the possibility that CEO stock ownership in a risky firm could “create incentives 
that actually give managers reasons to pursue ends not shared by the corporation’s 
public stockholders.”227 Likewise, the CEO “had powerful interests to agree to a 
price and terms suboptimal for public investors so long as the resulting deal” 
secured the CEO’s personal financial objectives of cashing out his equity stake.228  
With these conflicts in view, we can now ask whether any or all of them are 
amenable to policing by pre-closing actions seeking preliminary injunctions. For the 
first type of conflict—entrenchment—the answer is likely a qualified “yes.” The 
entrenchment motive only comes into play where there is a realistic prospect of a 
hostile bidder, and that potential bidder ought to be relatively well-situated to 
challenge improper defensive actions by the target board. Moreover, a court may be 
more willing to grant a preliminary injunction when the likely result is an improved 
offer or rival bid than when an injunction seems likely to kill the deal altogether. In 
a sense, this conclusion is unsurprising, given that the Revlon and Unocal doctrines 
were formulated in cases where entrenchment was the primary issue. Nonetheless, 
the “yes” is qualified because current doctrine gives boards so much leeway to use 
defensive measures that only an extremely motivated hostile bidder—or one facing 
a particularly egregious set of facts—would undertake the expense of litigation 
rather than simply moving on to other potential deals.229 
 
their stock is less valuable to them. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 170 (10th ed. 2011).  
 227.    In re Lear Corp. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 117 (Del. Ch. 2007).  
228. Id. Of course, the public stockholders could always vote the deal down. But, as is discussed 
more fully infra Part IV.F., in practice the managers can use their considerable information advantages 
and control over projected results to persuade the stockholders to accept a deal they would not accept 
if they were fully informed.  
229. As Barry Diller famously concluded following his unsuccessful battle to take over 
Paramount Communications: “They won. We lost. Next.” James Bates, Paramount Deal: As Show 
Closes, a Look at the Script, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 1994). 
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For the second type of conflict however—diversion of value to 
management—it is unlikely that pre-closing preliminary injunction actions could be 
effective. Certainly, potential acquirers are unlikely to make effective police, as 
bidders will typically be concerned only with the aggregate cost of the merger, and 
not with how that cost is divided between management and the stockholders. 
Stockholders could challenge the action, but unless another obvious buyer waits in 
the wings, they may be reluctant to do so if the available remedy is a preliminary 
injunction that might kill the deal altogether. Indeed, even when substantial 
evidence exists of managerial misconduct, a court may be hesitant to grant a 
potentially deal-killing preliminary injunction, rather than let stockholders decide 
whether “no deal” is less appetizing that a deal where management skims some off 
the top.230 
An injunction is simply not a remedy well-suited to the harm caused by 
management siphoning value from a merger. More appropriate would be to allow 
the stockholders to seek post-closing damages for the value diverted by 
management, under an enhanced standard of review appropriate to the fraught 
circumstances. Even this may not provide full compensation for what was lost, as 
it is probable that management would be willing to trade off more than one dollar 
of loss for the stockholders for every dollar of gain to themselves. But the possibility 
of money damages would have the great virtue of deterring such conduct in the first 
place. Corwin, however, forecloses this possibility. Under Corwin, as long as the 
relevant conflicts and side-deals are disclosed, a stockholder vote approving the 
merger would effectively extinguish all claims. 
It is worth noting at this point that although Corwin holds out the prospect of 
stockholders being able to show disclosure defects that rendered the stockholder 
approval uninformed, this is likely to be rare in practice. Most disclosure or 
securities fraud claims arise when faulty disclosures are revealed to have been faulty 
by subsequent events or disclosures, or by information uncovered in enforcement 
actions or related litigation discovery. In the case of a merger where the target 
company is going private, disappearing, or being subsumed within a larger entity, it 
 
230. Again, El Paso is an excellent illustration of this dynamic. Despite finding “that the 
plaintiffs have a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that the Merger was tainted by disloyalty,” 
then-Chancellor Strine concluded that “[b]ecause, however, there is no other bid on the table and the 
stockholders of El Paso, as the seller, have a choice whether to turn down the Merger themselves, the 
balance of harms counsels against a preliminary injunction.” In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 
432, 434 (Del. Ch. 2012); see also id. at 452 (“I reluctantly deny the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary 
injunction, concluding that the El Paso stockholders should not be deprived of the chance to decide 
for themselves about the Merger, despite the disturbing nature of some of the behavior leading to its 
terms.”); Brian Broughman, CEO Side Payments in Mergers and Acquisitions, 2017 BYU L. REV. 67, 
105 (2017) (“Judges do not have a line-item veto, and are therefore reluctant to strike down a  
multi-billion-dollar transaction because of side payments. Judges are reluctant to use their injunctive 
power for the same reason that shareholders and directors have trouble blocking such deals—a deal 
with an unsavory side payment is better than no deal at all.”). 
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is unlikely there will be any subsequent events or disclosures to reveal the falsity of 
the original disclosures, and Corwin itself will serve to block litigation discovery after 
the preliminary injunction stage. Thus, while Corwin allows management to disclose 
their misdeeds candidly and receive absolution via an informed stockholder vote, 
more furtive managers will likely be able to hide their indiscretions with little fear 
of subsequent revelation. The resulting dynamic is likely to be: if it comes out in 
discovery in a preliminary injunction action, disclose it and it will be sterilized by 
the stockholder vote; if it doesn’t come out pre-close, it never will. 
The third conflict—risk-aversion on the part of management—is also unlikely 
to be amenable to regulation by pre-closing preliminary injunction. Certainly, 
would-be acquirers will rarely have an incentive to argue that managers are 
undervaluing the target company. And it is a bold judge who will grant an injunction 
on this basis.231 Again, the prospect of post-closing damages—which Corwin makes 
vanishingly slim—is better calculated to provide compensation and, more 
importantly, deterrence. 
In sum, the argument that enhanced scrutiny under Revlon and Unocal is (and 
ought to be) designed only for pre-closing preliminary injunction actions is partly 
correct, but incomplete. Pre-closing scrutiny is likely to be appropriate and 
reasonably effective in dealing with managerial self-interest arising out of the 
entrenchment motive, but inappropriate and ineffective in policing other 
predictable and acute conflicts of interest in the merger context.  
C. Deference to the Stockholder Vote is not Supported by the Underlying Reasons for the 
Business Judgment Rule 
The argument that deference to a stockholder vote approving a merger is in 
keeping with the business judgment rule is, when one looks beneath the surface, an 
odd one. The key issue in both MFW and Corwin is what deference to accord to a 
stockholder vote. Both cases deal with a situation where management has already 
made a decision, and that decision is subject to a heightened standard of review 
(entire fairness in MFW and enhanced scrutiny in Corwin). The question, then, is 
whether to provide additional deference to a stockholder vote on the same decision. 
The business judgment rule is generally concerned with deference to the business 
decisions of managers, not stockholders, who are not typically vested with the 
power to make business decisions in the first place.232 As such, the rationales of the 
business judgment rule do not easily map on to the question of deference to a 
stockholder vote. 
 
231. See In re Lear Corp. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 123 (Del. Ch. 2007) (granting a 
preliminary injunction until supplemental disclosure was provided on the CEO’s financial motivations 
to sell). 
232. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003). 
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A classic statement of the reasoning behind the business judgment rule was 
given by Judge Winter in Joy v. North.233 Judge Winter identified three primary 
rationales. First, by investing in a firm, stockholders take on the risk of bad 
managerial decision-making voluntarily.234 Stockholders can refrain from investing 
in the first place, sell their shares, or elect different managers. This point is 
subsidiary to the more general point made in the last subsection, that most 
managerial decisions take place in a setting of repeat transactions, and are thus 
constrained by a host of factors. As Professor Bainbridge has elaborated in defense 
of the business judgment rule, operational decisions are subject to “an array of 
extrajudicial constraints that, in totality, give directors [an incentive] to exercise 
reasonable care in decision making.”235 
Second, judges are not well-situated to evaluate complex business decisions.236 
As the Michigan Supreme Court pithily noted in the foundational case Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Co., “The judges are not business experts.”237 As such, judicial modesty 
counsels a certain degree of deference to management, who are likely to be both 
better informed and more expert than the judges. 
Third, every business decision involves a degree of risk. Because risk and 
return generally go hand-in-hand, stockholders want directors to take risks.238 
Moreover, stockholders can reduce their exposure to these risks by holding a 
diversified portfolio.239 If stockholders get most of the gain when risks turn out 
well, but managers face a threat of personal liability when those risks turn out badly, 
management’s incentives will be to make decisions that minimize the chance of 
liability rather than maximize expected stockholder wealth.240 
The Corwin court emphasized the second of Judge Winter’s rationales for the 
business judgment rule, suggesting that its decision was “tied to the core rationale 
of the business judgment rule, which is that judges are poorly positioned to evaluate 
the wisdom of business decisions.”241 As an initial matter, this “core rationale” is 
 
233. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982). 
234. Id. at 885 (“Since shareholders can and do select among investments partly on the basis of 
management, the business judgment rule merely recognizes a certain voluntariness in undertaking the 
risk of bad business decisions.”). 
235. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,  
57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 130 (2004). 
236. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 (“[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect 
device to evaluate corporate decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not 
easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call for quick decisions, 
inevitably based on less than perfect information.”). 
237. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 508 (1919). 
238. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 (“[B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it 
is very much in the interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly cautious 
corporate decisions.”). 
239. Id. (“Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their holdings.”) (internal 
footnote omitted). 
240. Id. (“A rule which penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alternatives thus may not be in 
the interest of shareholders generally.”). 
241. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313 (Del. 2015). 
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not one that many academic commentators have found convincing, given that the 
same rationale would seem to apply with far greater force in any number of other 
contexts where courts are tasked with evaluating the actions of experts.242 But 
whatever its weaknesses as a rationale for deferring the managers—who can at least 
safely be presumed to have expert knowledge of the firm—it is significantly weaker 
as a rationale for deferring to stockholders.  
The Corwin court attempts to finesse this by providing a very different 
justification—that the stockholders can be deferred to because of their “actual 
economic stake in the outcome.”243 This is a very different argument, however, than 
the “core rationale” for the business judgment rule to which the court originally 
alluded. It suggests that even if stockholders are not better situated to evaluate the 
merger than the court, in terms of information and expertise, they are better 
motivated. The specialist judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery, however, 
themselves face powerful reputational incentives to make careful decisions.244 
The first and third Joy v. North rationales apply even less clearly in the context 
of a stockholder vote approving a merger. The first has no obvious application at 
all. And it is difficult to fit a stockholder vote into the third, as stockholders face 
no risk of personal liability from which they require shielding to encourage optimal 
risk-taking. As a practical matter, though, MFW and Corwin implicate deference to 
managers as much or more than deference to stockholders. As such, it is worth 
considering the application of these two justifications for business judgment rule 
deference to managers in the context of a merger. 
For the first, as noted above, a merger is a final period decision, rather than 
being part of a series of repeat transactions. For this reason, Professor Bainbridge, 
among others, has drawn a sharp “distinction between operational issues, such as 
whether to install lighting in a baseball park, and structural choices, especially those 
creating a final period situation, such as takeovers.”245 Bainbridge—certainly no fan 
of stockholder litigation—concludes that “[t]he former appropriately receives much 
less probing review than does the latter.”246 
The third rationale—not deterring risk-taking—may apply in the merger 
context, though it applies somewhat differently. A decision to agree to a merger is 
 
242. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 117 (calling this “an incomplete explanation for the 
business judgment rule at best”); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 
WIS. L. REV. 573, 581 (2000) (noting that “judges should find it far easier to overcome the barrier of 
expertise and stand in the shoes of outside directors than in those of almost any of the other 
professionals whose actions courts are routinely called upon to review”); Kent Greenfield & John  
E. Nilsson, Gradgrind’s Education: Using Dickens and Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the Business 
Judgment Rule, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 799, 825–26 (“This rationale . . . seems more than a little 
disingenuous.”). 
243. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 314. 
244. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 121 (discussing the powerful reputational incentives 
faced by Delaware’s chancellors). 
245. Id. at 129; see also E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in 
America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 394 (1997) (making a similar distinction). 
246. Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 129. 
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not a decision to take a risk with stockholders’ money with the hope of achieving a 
return for them in the future. It is a decision to stop taking risks, in exchange for a 
more certain payout in the here and now. It may not be the case that managers need 
judicial protection to induce them to take what is a fundamentally risk-averse 
decision. That said, if, all else being equal, agreeing to a merger were to place a 
director at greater risk of personal liability than not agreeing to a merger, directors 
may have an incentive to avoid even beneficial mergers. Thus, it is important that 
agreeing to a merger that is beneficial to stockholders does not place a director at a 
greater risk of personal liability than refusing to agree to the same merger. 
In sum, the core rationales of the business judgment rule provide little, if any, 
reason for deference to a stockholder vote. These rationales are also attenuated even 
for deference to managerial decisions in the context of a merger. 
D. Independent Directors and Institutional Stockholders  
Independent directors and institutional stockholders are not necessarily the 
reliable gatekeepers they may appear to be at first blush. Independent directors do 
not necessarily make effective monitors of managerial opportunism, and even 
sophisticated stockholders operate at a severe informational disadvantage vis-à-vis 
management. 
The Delaware courts’ trust in the cleansing power of independent directors is 
belied by a substantial empirical literature on their effectiveness, or lack thereof.247 
While the available evidence shows that majority-independent boards tend to 
perform better than the insider-dominated boards of yesteryear,248 the evidence 
changes direction when it comes to supermajority-independent boards where the 
CEO is the only inside director.249 Of particular concern in this context, the 
evidence casts doubt on the ability of supermajority boards—which are present at 
 
247. See, e.g., Velikonja, supra note 130, at 863 (“Surprisingly, a growing body of economic 
research has failed to find any statistical correlation between supermajority independent boards and 
corporate profitability or the likelihood of misconduct, leading academics and policy makers to question 
their value.”). 
248. See, e.g., id. at 867 (“Academic commentators generally agree that majority independent 
boards are a good thing, certainly better than their insider-dominated peers.”); Ira M. Millstein & Paul 
W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1292–94 (1998). 
249. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 950 (1999); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for 
the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 178 (2010); Jill Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO  
L. REV. 265, 279–80 (1997); Donald Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, 
and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 798 (2001); Larry 
E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 26–27 (2002); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of 
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1530 (2005); Velikonja, supra note 130, at 868 (“In 
contrast, virtually all academic commentators view supermajority independent boards as too much of a 
good thing.”). 
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a large majority of S&P 500 firms—to be effective at policing self-interested 
behavior by senior management.250  
These findings should not be surprising. Independent directors may be more 
willing to discipline executives, but lacking the detailed knowledge of the firm that 
comes from day-to-day involvement in management, they often lack the necessary 
information.251 The spirit is willing but the knowledge is weak. To a very large 
extent, independent directors are forced to rely upon the information provided to 
them by the very managers they are meant to discipline.252 In evaluating the 
desirability of a merger, independent directors will often be forced to rely on 
management projections, the accuracy of which they may have difficulty evaluating. 
In some cases, they may be little more informed than the stockholders and equally 
dependent on information provided to them by management. 
And despite the rise in institutional investors, there remains a serious 
informational asymmetry between corporate managers and stockholders. Even a 
sophisticated activist investor will find it difficult or impossible to acquire the 
information—including properly non-public information—that corporate 
managers acquire in the process of their day-to-day work.253 Even sophisticated 
institutional investors are forced to rely, in large part, on the information disclosed 
to them by management. In many cases, it would be difficult for management to 
fully convey to investors the information required to accurately value the firm, even 
if they in good faith wanted to.254 The problem is that much more acute where, as 
in a merger, management has powerful incentive to dissemble and little fear of 
future repercussions.255 
 
250. See, e.g., Bhagat & Black, supra note 249, at 931, 931 nn.35–38 (summarizing empirical 
studies showing that supermajority independent boards were correlated with higher executive 
compensation and lower performance); Broughman, supra note 230, at 92–93 (“[A]s long as the CEO 
remains the primary deal negotiator, even an independent board cannot wholly prevent rent 
extraction.”); R. Richard Geddes & Hrishikesh D. Vinod, CEO Age and Outside Directors: A Hazard 
Analysis, 12 REV. INDUS. ORG. 767, 769 (1997) (finding that majority-independent boards were more 
likely than majority-insider boards to fire a CEO, but supermajority-independent boards were less likely 
to do so).  
251. See, e.g., Bhagat & Black, supra note 249, at 950; Velikonja, supra note 130, at 868 (“[W]holly 
independent boards might be marginally more willing than only majority independent boards to fire a 
failing chief executive or stop fraud, [but] they are less able to do so because their independence renders 
them unaware of the problem.”). 
252. See, e.g., Bhagat & Black, supra note 249, at 953; Jeffrey Gordon, The Rise of Independent 
Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices,  
59 STAN. L. REV., 1465, 1541 (2007); Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process Over Structure: An Organizational 
Behavior Approach to Improving Corporate Boards, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 261, 266 (2012) (stating that 
independent directors “face multiple informational disadvantages that may make it difficult for them 
to evaluate management’s decisions.”); Velikonja, supra note 130, at 868 (“Many believe the share of 
independent directors on the board and the amount of relevant information that the board possesses 
are inversely correlated.”). 
253. If this were not the case, insider trading would rarely be profitable. 
254. See generally Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and 
the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601 (2012). 
255. See discussion supra Section IV.B. 
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Though the share of stock held by institutional investors continues to grow, 
there is also reason to think that information asymmetries will worsen in the near 
future. A large and growing share of institutional investment is in the form of 
“passive” index funds. Such investors, who currently hold approximately 30% of 
U.S. equities, seek to assemble a diversified portfolio tracking a broad index such 
as the S&P 500.256 They seek to offer a market return and compete by offering the 
lowest possible fees to individual investors. As a result, they expend little or no 
effort seeking to value the firms they invest in. While these index funds are certainly 
“sophisticated” investors in the sense that they understand the central lesson of 
modern portfolio theory—that picking stocks is usually a fool’s errand—they are 
not “sophisticated” in the sense of knowing anything about the firms they invest 
in.257 The whole philosophy of index investing is that it is unnecessary to know 
anything about the firms you invest in. This philosophy, however, makes index 
investors—who are projected by Moody’s to make up more than half of the assets 
in the investment management business within the next four to seven years258—
singularly unlikely to make effective judges of fair value in a merger. When added 
to the approximately 20% share of U.S. equities owned by individuals, we may 
already be at or near the point where a majority of the stockholder vote is effectively 
totally uninformed. 
E. Incentive Effects of MFW 
Probably the best justification for the holding of MFW is that it provides 
controlling stockholders with an incentive—previously lacking—to employ a deal 
structure likely to result in fair treatment of the minority stockholders. It is primarily 
for this reason that several respected scholars had urged the result in MFW,259 and 
I acknowledge its force in the controlling stockholder context. It should be noted, 
however, that this rationale has little or no force when applied to Corwin, as Corwin 
does not require management to do anything they were not already required to do—
provide full disclosure and hold a stockholder vote. 
 
256. Investopedia describes an index fund as “a type of mutual fund with a portfolio 
constructed to match or track components of a market index, such as the Standard & Poor’s 500 
Index (S&P 500).” Index Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/
indexfund.asp [https://perma.cc/457C-RZUF] ( last visited Apr. 9, 2019). 
257. See id. (“Since the fund managers of an index fund are simply replicating the performance 
of a benchmark index, they do not need the services of research analysts and others that assist in the 
stock-selection process.”); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An 
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 864 (1991) (noting that the index investor “does 
not research the particular characteristics of a company”). 
258. See Trevor Hunnicutt, Index Funds to Surpass Active Fund Assets in U.S. by 2024: Moody’s, 
REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2017) (quoting a Moody’s report estimating “that passive investments will overtake 
active market share between 2021 and 2024”), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-passive/
index-funds-to-surpass-active-fund-assets-in-u-s-by-2024-moodys-idUSKBN15H1PN [https://
perma.cc/P5F7-VB9X].  
259. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 16, at 839–40; Subramanian, supra note 16, at 60–61. 
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A few additional points are worth making. As the MFW opinion recognized, 
the benefits of the improved deal structure must be balanced against the loss of 
judicial scrutiny.260 The court concluded that the benefits of judicial scrutiny were 
“slim at best, and there is a good case to made that it is negative overall.”261 Other 
balances, however, were possible. Instead of dropping all the way from entire 
fairness to business judgment rule deference in exchange for employing an 
independent committee and majority-of-the-minority condition, the court could 
have simply reduced the standard of review to enhanced scrutiny. In this way, 
controllers would still have an incentive to adopt the desired precautions, but some 
prospect of judicial scrutiny would be preserved. 
Perhaps the best response to this argument is that enhanced scrutiny would 
be both too much, and too little. On the one hand, it would make it difficult to get 
claims dismissed before discovery, thus preserving the settlement value of even 
nuisance suits. On the other, enhanced scrutiny would not provide much value to 
stockholders that they could not achieve by seeking appraisal.262 As a result, the 
holding of MFW, while setting the table for the unfortunate Corwin, is probably a 
net positive as a policy matter. 
F. Stockholder Approval of a Merger Does Not Resemble Traditional Ratification 
The analogy of stockholder approval of a merger to ratification appears 
throughout both the MFW and Corwin opinions. Indeed, as noted above, the 
majority of the cases relied upon by the Corwin court—to demonstrate the deep 
precedential roots of its holding—involved stockholder approval of something 
other than a merger.263 Some of them, such as approval of options grants, involved 
what Gantler termed “classic” ratification. Others were statutorily required votes, 
such as approval of charter amendments, which were not technically “ratification” 
but nonetheless had a ratifying effect. The analogy to a merger vote is, in many ways, 
natural. If the majority of stockholders find the merger acceptable, why should they 
now be permitted to turn around and complain? 
This analogy, however, is fatally flawed. Classic ratification requires a separate 
vote for each specific action being ratified.264 A stockholder vote on a merger is a 
bundled Hobson’s choice—take it, warts and all, or leave it. In theory, a negative 
stockholder vote could send the parties back to the negotiating table to hammer out 
 
260. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 534 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“The loss from invoking the 
business judgment rule standard of review is whatever residual value it provides to minority investors 
to have the potential for a judicial review of fairness . . . .”). 
261. Id. 
262. To the extent, however, that a price approved by an independent committee and a majority 
of the minority stockholders is treated in an appraisal proceeding as strongly persuasive evidence of fair 
value, the compensatory and deterrence value of an appraisal proceeding would be vitiated. See infra 
Part IV.G. 
263. See supra 167–89 and accompanying text. 
264. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2019) (requiring that “the contract or transaction 
is specifically approved”). 
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a better deal, but often there is a real prospect that stockholder rejection will scuttle 
the merger altogether. As a result, the practical question facing stockholders is often 
not “Is this deal the best price reasonably available?” or even “Is this deal fair?” but 
rather “Is this deal better than no deal?” Sometimes an unfair deal is better than no 
deal at all.265 Yet Corwin collapses the innumerable decisions and actions attendant 
to a merger into a single yes or no vote for purposes of ratification.266 
A stylized example may be helpful in illustrating the resulting problem. 
Ignoring for a moment that stockholders are typically operating with serious 
informational disadvantages,267 assume stockholders have perfect information 
about the value of the firm and about managerial actions. Assume further that they 
know that the firm is worth $80 per share on a standalone basis. They also know 
that, due to substantial synergies and cost savings, the firm would be worth $120 
per share to a competitor in a merger. With competent bargaining by faithful 
management, they could expect to split those gains with the buyers, achieving a 
“fair” price of $100. But management is unfaithful, and skims $5 per share off the 
top in the form of sweetheart side-deals, presenting the stockholders with a deal for 
$90 per share—trading off $2 in stockholder value for every dollar they capture—
and no assurance that any deal will be reached if the stockholders reject the $90. 
Even in the presence of full information, the stockholders are likely to approve the 
deal. The reality is worse, of course, given that stockholders will not have full 
information, and management will be doing their best to convince them that $90 is 
really a fantastic deal, and the best they could possibly hope for.  
This problem is at the heart of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Santa 
Fe, which the Corwin court declined to confront. As the Santa Fe court emphasized, 
a vote in favor of the merger was not a vote in favor of the defensive measures 
being challenged.268 The stockholders were not, and could not, be offered that 
 
265. As Vice Chancellor Laster put it in the context of a controlling stockholder squeeze-out, 
“[e]ven accepting that the minority stockholders can reject a controller’s proposal, collective action 
problems prevent diffuse minority stockholders from bargaining affirmatively for better terms.” Laster, 
supra note 22, at 1462. Even outside the controller context, stockholders would face significant hurdles 
in seeking to arrange an alternative deal, or in replacing a board with directors who will.  
266. See Brian Broughman, CEO Side Payments in Mergers and Acquisitions, 2017  
BYU L. REV. 67, 87 (2017) (“By bundling the side payment into a single yes-or-no merger vote, 
management makes it impossible for target shareholders to oppose the side payment without also 
voting against the merger. Provided the bundled deal is better than the status quo (i.e. no merger), 
shareholders will rationally vote in favor of the entire transaction.”); id. at 67. 
267. See Sharpe, supra note 252, at 266. 
268. In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d 59, 68 (Del. 1995); see also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 
(Del. 2009) (citing approvingly to Santa Fe and noting that “the only director action or conduct that 
can be ratified is that which the shareholders are specifically asked to approve”); Sample v. Morgan, 
914 A.2d 647, 663–64 (Del. Ch. 2007). In Sample v. Morgan, then Vice-Chancellor Strine declined to 
find that stockholder approval of a stock option plan ratified the actual issuances of options pursuant 
to that plan. 914 A.2d at 633–64. Strine emphasized that “the Delaware doctrine of ratification does 
not embrace a ‘blank check’ theory. When uncoerced, fully informed, and disinterested stockholders 
approve a specific corporate action, the doctrine of ratification, in most situations, precludes claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty attacking that action. But the mere approval by stockholders of a request by 
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choice. They were “merely offered a choice between the [Board’s favored] Merger 
and doing nothing.”269 Under Corwin, however, the stockholder vote provides 
omnibus absolution, and any defensive measures and side-payments are ratified 
along with everything else. 
As a result, the incentives of management will be to present stockholders with 
a deal that is just enough better than the alternatives to secure their approval, while 
skimming as much as possible of the surplus value created by the merger for 
themselves. In a sense, it will be true, as the Corwin court claims, that the 
stockholders “have had the free and informed chance to decide on the economic 
merits of a transaction for themselves.”270 But this is, at best, lukewarm comfort. 
The stockholders’ evaluation of the economic merits is usually limited to finding 
that the deal, warts and all, is better than nothing. The possibility remains of 
significant deadweight losses to unfaithful management. 
G. Appraisal is Not a Full Substitute 
Elsewhere, together with Professor Myers, I have written extensively on 
stockholder appraisal, cautiously praising it, and even proposing an alternative to 
the class action mechanism patterned after some of the features of appraisal.271 My 
heart beats a little faster to see the Delaware courts reference appraisal as a viable 
alternative to a class action. In theory, appraisal, or something like appraisal, could 
be a comprehensive alternative to merger class actions.272 But in the here and now, 
appraisal is limited as a judicial backstop for at least three major reasons. 
First, appraisal is not always available. In particular, appraisal is not available 
in mergers where the consideration is publicly traded stock.273 This is so even when 
the transaction constitutes a change of control that would trigger Revlon scrutiny. 
Professor Myers and I have argued that conditioning the availability of appraisal on 
the form of consideration is a mistake.274 But thus far the Delaware legislature has 
not heeded our wisdom, and appraisal can play no role in a stock-for-stock merger. 
Second, recent judicial trends in appraisal have mirrored developments in 
merger class action law. In particular, in cases involving apparent arm’s-length 
mergers, the Delaware courts have been increasingly likely to defer to the negotiated 
 
directors for the authority to take action within broad parameters does not insulate all future action by 
the directors within those parameters from attack.” Id. 
269. In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 68. 
270. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313 (Del. 2015); see also In re MFW 
S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 534 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[A] majority-of-the-minority condition gives 
minority investors a free and voluntary opportunity to decide what is fair for themselves.”). 
271. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition: Replacing the Class 
Action with a Market for Legal Claims, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1323 (2016). 
272. See id. at 1370. 
273. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (2019). 
274. See Myers & Korsmo, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 41 BROOK. L. REV. 279, 288 
(2017). 
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merger price as the best evidence of fair value.275 Most recently, in DFC Global276 
and Dell,277 the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized the high hurdle for departing 
from the negotiated price. In short, many of the same considerations that have 
caused the court to grant business judgment rule deference in the class action 
context have also caused it to grant deference to the negotiated price in the  
appraisal context.278  
Third, appraisal petitioners must forgo the merger consideration in order to 
pursue appraisal.279 While recent amendments to Section 262 allow the acquirer to 
pre-pay undisputed amounts in order to avoid the running of interest, this is a 
unilateral option the acquirer need not exercise.280 Accordingly, petitioners face 
substantial opportunity costs from having their capital tied up, potentially for years, 
while bearing the costs and risks of litigation. As a result, appraisal is a relatively 
blunt tool, which will only be worth using where the merger consideration is 
substantially below fair value in percentage terms.  
Assume, for example, managers skimmed $100 million off the top of a $10 
billion merger, and stockholders holding 10% of the stock think they can prove it, 
showing that fair value was really $10.1 billion. While $100 million is large in 
absolute terms and would likely make a class action worthwhile, appraisal petitioners 
are unlikely to tie up $1 billion and bear the costs and risks of litigation in pursuit 
of $10 million (their share of the amount diverted). The structure of appraisal—in 
particular the need to forgo the merger consideration—makes it ill-suited to control 
deadweight losses that, while large in absolute terms, are small in percentage terms. 
H. The Benefits of Merger Litigation 
The evidence that merger litigation has not heretofore functioned well is 
canvassed above and need not be repeated. A few caveats, however, are in order. 
There is, at this point, a mountain of evidence that the merits have not historically 
mattered in merger litigation.281 That the merits do not matter, however, should not 
 
275. See, e.g., Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Services, Inc., C.A. No. 9320-VCL, 2016 
WL 7324170, at *30–33 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016); Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc.,  
C.A. No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 6164771 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015); Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 
C.A. No. 8509-VCN, 2015 WL 2069417, at *56 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015); In re Appraisal of 
Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015); cf. Dunmire  
v. Farmers & Merchants Bancorp of W. Pa., Inc., C.A. No. 10589-CB, 2016 WL 6651411  
(Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2016). 
276. DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 366 (Del. 2017). 
277. Dell, Inc., v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 23–31  
(Del. 2017). 
278. At least one member of the Court of Chancery has concluded that the logic of the recent 
Supreme Court pronouncements on appraisal may—where significant synergies exist—compel the trial 
court to award the unaffected, pre-announcement market price in an appraisal proceeding. See Verition 
Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448-VCL, 2018 WL 922139, at *66, *124–
28 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018). 
279. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(2)(e). 
280. Id. at § 262(2)(h). 
281. See Wolinsky & Schireson, supra note 56. 
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be taken to imply that there are no merits. The “merits don’t matter” problem is 
two-sided. Meritless claims are brought and settled quickly. And meritorious claims 
are brought and also settled (usually too quickly).  
It is worth considering the likely scale of the problem. It is impossible to 
quantify the costs of merger litigation with any precision, but we can make some 
(extremely) crude estimates. Cain et al. find approximately one hundred mergers 
being challenged each year since 2010, with some cases being dismissed, and a few 
score—eighty-nine in the busiest year—settlements each year.282 While some claims 
result in more meaningful settlements (and more meaningful legal fees), the bulk of 
the settlements—and the most obviously troubling ones—are disclosure-only.283 
For these settlements, the mean legal fees awarded hovers around $500,000.284 With 
these figures in mind, if we assume a worst-case scenario of one hundred disclosure-
only settlements a year, that would come to $50 million in plaintiff’s attorney fees. 
Even if we multiply this figure by a factor of ten to account for other deadweight 
costs of litigation, this comes to $500 million per year, spread across the multi-
trillion-dollar deal market. As taxes go, the “deal litigation tax” is far from the most 
onerous.285  
Of course, if deal litigation produces no benefits, any costs at all are a waste. 
And cases providing real compensation for stockholders are few and far between.286 
Nonetheless, compensation is only one value implicated in litigation, and likely not 
the primary one in merger litigation, where the value of deterrence will tend to loom 
larger. Even a small likelihood of personal monetary liability—or even just the 
prospect that embarrassing facts will be revealed in discovery—can serve a powerful 
deterrent function, providing far greater societal benefit than any after-the-fact 
compensation for stockholders.  
In this respect, a recent study provides intriguing findings that the average 
value of change-in-control packages for senior executives in deals “substantial 
enough to warrant an ISS recommendation” was 2.1% of deal value in the first half 
of 2017, as compared to an average of 1.36% from 2012–2016.287 While the 
 
282. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 26. 
283. Id. at 24. 
284. Jill Fisch, Sean Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement 
in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 568 (2015). 
285. To perform the classic comparison designed to make large dollar amounts seem small, 
$500 million in merger litigation costs would represent less than 1% of the $66.75 billion Americans 
spent on their pets in 2016. See Pet Industry Market Size & Ownership Statistics, AMERICAN PET 
PRODUCTS, http://www.americanpetproducts.org/press_industrytrends.asp [https://perma.cc/AH 
5V-UVL7] ( last visited Apr. 12, 2019). 
286. But see Joel E. Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using Data Points of Successful 
Stockholder Litigation as a Tool for Reform, BUS. LAW. (manuscript at 3–6) (forthcoming 2018) 
(collecting cases involving substantial monetary recoveries for stockholders). 
287. Matthew Schoenfeld, The High Cost of Fewer Appraisal Claims in 2017: Premia Down, 
Agency Costs Up 4–5 (Aug. 29, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3028381 
[https://perma.cc/7GS5-VT9Q].  
First to Printer_Korsmo (Do Not Delete) 10/29/2019  1:34 PM 
2019] DELAWARE’S RETREAT  105 
evidence is far too limited to ascribe this increase to any particular cause,288 it does 
serve as a useful reminder that even small changes in management behavior can 
create effects that dwarf the costs of merger litigation. 
In any event, the evidence that merger litigation produces, on net, little benefit 
all pre-dates Trulia. It is frustrating, from a social science standpoint, that Trulia and 
Corwin came so close together in time, making it impossible to untangle their effects. 
We will never know what effect Trulia—whose approach promised to limit meritless 
litigation while encouraging meritorious litigation—would have had independent of 
Corwin—which, as I argue above, made even meritorious claims difficult or 
impossible to pursue. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The crisis in merger litigation demanded a judicial response. Unfortunately, it 
got two. In Trulia, it got the response that was required, a new scrutiny of the low-
value settlements and releases that provided the fuel for the spread of merger 
litigation. Trulia promised to block low-value litigation, while enabling high-value 
litigation to be litigated more effectively. In Corwin, however, the merger crisis 
received a response that may do more harm than good. The doctrine espoused in 
Corwin—whether it is new or not—will certainly reduce meritless merger litigation. 
But it is also effectively forecloses the possibility of judicial scrutiny for predictable 
forms of managerial opportunism that are unlikely to be adequately policed by 
independent directors, stockholders, or competing bidders. 
In closing, I will offer some tentative prescriptions. Ideally, the effects of 
Trulia would have been allowed to play out without any other significant changes 
to the substantive law. It is worth remembering that data from prior to the merger 
litigation boom suggested that merger class actions were functioning relatively 
well.289 Given the ability of plaintiff’s lawyers to bring merger suits in non-Delaware 
jurisdictions,290 it would have taken some time for the post-Trulia picture to become 
clear, with other jurisdictions adopting (or not adopting) the Trulia standard, and 
firms employing (or not employing) forum-selection bylaws or other measures to 
keep litigation in Delaware.291 At that point, additional measures, such as fee-
 
288. In particular, it could be an artifact of rising equity prices in 2017 increasing the value of 
stock options that vest in the event of a change-of-control. 
289. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 17, at 137–38. 
290. See, e.g., Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 467 
(2014). 
291. See, e.g., William B. Chandler III & Anthony A. Rickey, The Trouble with Trulia: Re-
evaluating the Case for Fee-Shifting Bylaws as a Solution to Overlitigation of Corporate Claims 2 (Apr. 4, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2946477 [https://perma.cc/K3N9-
5CTD]; Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can Fix the Deal Tax 
and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t 1, 12 ( Jan. 5, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2855950 [https://perma.cc/S5MQ-HCY2]. 
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shifting bylaws, could have been considered as necessary.292 Unfortunately, Corwin 
cut short this process and muddied the empirical picture. 
Steps are possible, however, short of reversing course on Corwin altogether, 
which seems an unlikely prospect. One possibility would be to distinguish more 
carefully than has thus far been done among the various types of conflicts that  
can plague takeover situations. Three such conflicts were catalogued  
above: 1) entrenchment; 2) diversion of merger value; and 3) risk-aversion due to 
concentrated holdings. Of these, only entrenchment is likely to be adequately 
policed by the pre-closing preliminary injunction actions Corwin holds out as the 
only option. The other two are unlikely to be seriously constrained by independent 
directors, a stockholder vote, or a preliminary injunction action. Both are far better 
suited for scrutiny via a post-closing money damages action. Both also involve self-
serving conduct of the type that could potentially satisfy Lyondell’s good faith 
analysis. For diversion-of-value conflicts, one option for allowing such claims to 
proceed would be to find it coercive for management to ask stockholders to 
approve, in a single vote, both the merger and the diversion of value, and thus not 
cleansing under Corwin. It is less clear this would be plausible in the risk-aversion 
context. But to the extent that Corwin left the door open to claims targeting these 
particular conflicts, the Court of Chancery should walk through 
 
 
292. See id. 
